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Executive Summary 
This master thesis in financial economics asks whether banks have taken advantage of a 
superior informational position in the sale of so-called structured products.  Structured 
products sold by Norwegian financial institutions have received extensive criticism over the 
last few years, and estimates show that customers may have lost more than 14 billion NOK 
by investing in these products.   
The first part of this thesis will present the reader with a theoretical framework for 
understanding structured products, before providing an overview of the history of these 
products in the Norwegian context.  The thesis will then use the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique to conduct a thorough analysis of the two products DnB Global and Sektor 
2000/2006, which due to an impending litigation is expected to set presedence for how 
complaints on these types of products will be treated in the legal system.  The analysis 
confirms the results from previous studies that these products had a negative expected return 
when debt financed. 
In the second part of this paper I will conduct a more qualitative analysis, discussing issues 
such as why distributors were selling these products and why customers were unable to 
understand that the products represented inferior investment strategies.  The thesis concludes 
that the banks have misused their customers‟ trust and confidence in the sale of structured 
products. 
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1. Introduction 
”Abraham Lincoln posed the question: ‘How many legs does a dog have if you call a tail 
a leg?’ Honest Abe’s answer was four. A tail is still a tail even if you call it a leg.” 
Kay (2009, p. 13) 
1.1 Background 
The quality of financial advice provided by banks and other financial intermediaries has 
been a hot topic in Norwegian media and academia over the last few years.  Financial 
advisers have been highly criticised for their apparent failure to separate the roles of adviser 
and seller, and bank executives have been accused of chasing short-term profits instead of 
focusing on the long-term interest of their clients.  Examples of poor financial advice are 
frequently coming to light, and the magnitude of these errors is a reason for concern.  Some 
recent cases include  
 Sparebank1‟s hedge fund sale to a demented 88-year old.  The elderly gentleman was 
encouraged to place the vast majority of his liquid assets in the fund, which have lost 
55 per cent of its value since November 2007 (Vanvik, 2009).  The Norwegian 
Bureau for Banking and Financial Services Disputes (Bankklagenemnda) 
recommended that the bank compensate the man in order to restore him to his 
original financial position (Bankklagenemnda, 2009-005). 
 
 In 2004 a 20 year old man with intermittent contract employment and no capital 
purchased a certificate of deposit linked to a hedge fund indexed.  The seller was a 
financial agent for SEB Privatbanken, who also financed the NOK 500,000 
investment, which was 2.4 times the 20 year-old‟s annual income (Gran, Hegle, & 
Mikalsen, 2009).  Bankklagenemnda recommended that the bank should compensate 
the man so and return him to his original financial position as if the investment and 
loan-agreement never took place, as well as cover his legal expenses 
(Bankklagenemnda, 2009-019).  The bank has pronounced that they do not intend to 
comply with Bankklagenemnda‟s advice.  
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In a recent opinion piece in Dagens Næringsliv
1
, assistant professor Trond Døskeland (2009) 
of NHH comments that while private investors should exercise caution when taking advice 
from bank employees, they might not even be able to trust their own judgement in financial 
decision making.  Recent international surveys have shown that many individuals are 
financially illiterate, that is, they do not understand the fundamental principles and 
relationships of personal finance (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2005).  Financial advisers thus face the challenge of not only providing the 
best advice possible, but also of ensuring that the clients truly understand how the proposed 
strategy can affect their wealth.  Another challenge is that while advisers are expected to 
provide sound recommendations based on their clients‟ financial situation and risk 
preferences, they are essentially employees employed by the bank to sell the products that 
the bank is offering.  This issue raises the question of whether it is possible to effectively and 
ethically balance the roles of adviser and seller.  In essence this is a question of loyalty, and 
the frequent examples and criticism in the media suggest that the allegiance in many cases 
does not lie with the customers.  
Many of the cases referred to earlier concern financial advice given in relation to the sale of 
so-called structured products.  The perhaps most visible of these cases is the debate 
concerning the two indexed bonds DnB Global and DnB Sektor 2000/2006.  Investor Ivar 
Petter Røeggen brought a complaint to Bankklagenemnda arguing that the bank failed to 
inform him that the expected return from debt-financing these two products were not only 
disproportionate to the inherent risks, but in fact negative.  The complaint was based on 
conclusions from an extensive report prepared by Steen Koekebakker and Valeri 
Zakamouline at the University of Agder (previously Høgskolen i Agder).  While processing 
the complaint was time-consuming Bankklagenemnda reached a decision earlier this year; 
they recommended that DnB NOR, Norway‟s largest financial institution, should restore the 
client to his original financial position, i.e. compensate him as if the investment never took 
place (Bankklagenemnda, 2009-001).  The bank has chosen not to comply with this 
recommendation, and the complainant has commenced the process of pursuing the case 
trough the legal system (Forbrukerrådet, 2009b; Stranden, 2009).  The case is of principal 
                                                 
1 Norway‟s leading newspaper for business, trade and industry news.  
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importance as it is expected to set precedence for a number of complaints on the marketing, 
advice and sale on this particular group of products.        
Structured products like DnB Global and Sektor became increasingly popular in Norway at 
the turn of the millennium, no doubt due to the fact that they seemingly offer a way to avoid 
the classic risk and return relationship of finance.  These products were touted as a way to 
protect principal and snag market gains; a method of potentially achieving high returns all 
the while carrying low risk.  Then the credit crisis hit.  When the bubble burst it became 
evident that the quality of these products in many cases were just as bad as the army of 
academics warned; and they have as such become highly central to the debate concerning 
financial planning and advice in Norway.  Bjerksund (2008) have estimated that Norwegian 
bank clients have lost in the vicinity of 980-1,276 million kroner yearly in fees, bank 
margins and hidden costs, before taking return on the actual investments into account
2
.  The 
hard-earned lesson is, as financial markets have proven time and again; you can‟t have your 
cake and eat it too.   
1.2 Research aim and research questions 
The main research aim of this master thesis is to analyse whether or not banks as product 
distributors and financial advisers have taken advantage of a superior informational position 
in the marketing and sale of debt financed structured products in Norway
3
.  There are in 
particular two issues we need to address in order to provide an answer to the previous 
question.  Firstly we need to show that these products are in general not an attractive 
investment strategy for the average investor, and particularly not so when the investments 
are debt financed.  The two protected equity notes DnB Global and Dnb Sektor 2000/2006 
will here be used as an illustrative case, because of their expected principal importance 
regarding how complaints in relation to structured products will be treated in the Norwegian 
                                                 
2 Comparatively, the municipalities‟ losses in relation to the Terra-case, one of the largest financial scandals ever to have 
occurred in Norway have been estimated to approximately 800 MNOK.   
3 While this paper focus on the role of banks in the sale of structured products, there are also other financial institutions that 
have been distributing these products in Norway, most notably investment firms such as Orkla Finans and Acta 
Kapitalforvaltning.  The financial advisers of Acta in particular have been subject to much criticism in relation to the 
structured products debate (Bjørndal & Fadnes, 2008).  Furthermore, while the banks in most cases have been responsible 
for the actual design and distribution of the products, other investment firms and banks are normally involved in the 
production by holding the short positions in the option contracts embedded in the products.  For the remainder of this paper 
however, I will focus on the banks as distributors of these products 
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legal system in the future.  Secondly, it is necessary to analyse how and why the banks were 
able to convince so many of their customers to invest in what were, in essence, inferior 
investment and saving products.  The specific research questions of this thesis are thus: 
Supporting questions: 
I. Using the Monte Carlo simulation technique, what is the estimated expected return of 
the two products DnB Global and DnB Sektor 2000/2006? 
II. What are the major factors and incentives influencing buyer and seller behaviour in 
the Norwegian structured product market?   
Main research question: 
III. Is there any evidence that product providers have taken advantage of information 
asymmetry in the sale of structured products? 
1.3 Structure of the paper 
In order to address these research questions I will in chapter 2 present a framework for 
analysing structured products.  This chapter contains an introduction to the most important 
components of structured products; bonds and options, as well as a suggestion for how these 
components and the total structured package can be priced.    
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the Norwegian structured products market and its most 
important players, current regulations and trends.   
In the following chapter I will discuss how previous studies have evaluated the two products 
in question, explain the Monte Carlo simulation technique and use this tool to estimate the 
expected return on DnB Global and DnB Sektor 2000/2006.   
Chapter 5 contains an analysis of how and why structured products have become so popular 
in Norway; it will examine problems of irrational preferences and information asymmetry, 
and discuss what incentives and factors have influenced behaviour in the market. 
Conclusions and final comments are provided in chapter 6.  
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2. A theoretical framwork for structured products 
Structured products are relatively complicated instruments that are difficult for people 
without an extensive understanding and knowledge of financial markets and derivatives 
theory to fully comprehend.  However, in order to investigate the structured product market 
and appreciate why these products generally are more attractive for the bank than for the 
investor, it is crucial to understand the underlying characteristics of the products involved.  
In this section I will therefore provide a brief introduction to structured products and the 
individual building blocks that are used to construct these investment strategies.   
2.1 What is a structured product? 
Structured products originally developed to meet specific needs that standardised financial 
instruments are unable to meet.  Although there is no uniform definition, the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission defines structured products in Regulation C of the Securities Act 
as “securities whose cash flow characteristics depend upon one or more indices or that have 
imbedded forwards or options or securities where an investor's investment return and the 
issuer's payment obligations are contingent on, or highly sensitive to, changes in the value of 
underlying assets, indices, interest rates or cash flows” (SEC, 2003).  When structured 
products were first marketed they were normally tied to strong, important stock market 
indices.  However, as the products developed they became more frequently linked to quite 
different reference portfolios; self-composed and industry portfolios, as well as to a range of 
other underlying assets such as interest rates, currencies, energy contracts and commodities 
(Loven & Garås, 2008).  Hence, structured products give investors a method of gaining 
specific exposure to a vast range of markets and commodities without actually owning the 
asset – and thus also an opportunity to invest in asset classes they may have previously 
considered too risky.   
A structured product is created by combining financial instruments with the aim of 
structuring the cash flows from the packaged investment strategy to meet investor‟s risk and 
return preferences.  Most often this is done by combining a guaranteed cash flow, for 
example a zero-coupon bond or a bank deposit, with a risky derivative such as one or more 
option or to a lesser extent warrants and swaps.  For example, if the investor invests 100 
NOK the issuer would simply put enough capital in a risk-free bond so that when interest is 
 12 
compounded the amount will grow to 100 NOK after the pre-determined time-period.  The 
leftover funds are then used to purchase the options or swaps needed to perform whatever 
the investment strategy is.  I have set up a numerical example of how these products may be 
structured, and this is provided in Figure 2 below.  Assume that investor‟s initial payment is 
104, where 4 is used to cover the bank‟s fees, and 100 is invested in the structured product.  
The bank deposit is offering a 5 per cent p.a. interest rate and the maturity of the product is 
in 5 years.  The bank will place 78.35
4
 in zero-coupon bonds, and use the left-over funds to 
by options.  At maturity the bond will pay out 100.  The risk associated with these types of 
products is related to whether or not the option has a payoff, and if so what the size of this 
payoff is.   
The investor should in theory be able to perform the same actions by trading in financial 
markets himself; however the costs and transaction volume requirements involved are often 
too high to be carried by individual investors.     
 
                                                 
4 100/1.055=78.35 
+ 
Investor’s payment 
104 
 
Invested amount 
100 
104 
 
Transaction fees 
4 
 
Bank deposit (5%) 
78.35 
 
Options 
21.65 
 
Deposit at maturity: 
100 
 
Options at maturity: 
Max ( ?, 0)  
 
Total return 
100 + ?? 
 
Figure 1: Creating a structured product 
 13 
In the Norwegian setting the two most popular structured products are the protected equity 
note
5
 (aksjeindeksobligasjon, AIO) and the market-linked (equity-linked) certificate of 
deposit (banksparing med aksjeavkastning, BMA).  The protected equity note is typically 
designed to return principal at maturity along with a portion of any gains in one or more pre-
determined indices (Laise, 2008).  This payoff is constructed by combining a zero-coupon 
bond with options on the relevant underlying indices.  The market-linked certificate of 
deposit is similar to the principal-protected note, but in this case the guaranteed element is 
granted by a bank (term) deposit as opposed to a zero-coupon bond.  As bank deposits up to 
2 million NOK are absolutely guaranteed through the Norwegian Banks‟ Guarantee Fund, 
investors do not have to consider credit risk when pricing these investments (Loven & Garås, 
2008; Laise, 2008).  On the other hand it is necessary to consider the issuer‟s risk of default 
when valuing structured products that are based on bonds, as the principal protection here 
depends on the issuer‟s ability to meet its obligations.   
2.2 Components to structured products 
Structured products are created through financial engineering, which refers to “the creation 
and design of securities with custom-tailored characteristics” (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2005, 
p. 24).  The products consist of bundles of risk-free and risky cash flows that are supposedly 
packaged according to the needs and desires of investors.  However, this bundling of 
primitive and derivative securities can make it quite difficult for the average investor to fully 
comprehend and assess the risk and return relationship, and thus the value, of the composite 
security. This is, as I will discuss at a later stage, in fact one of the major criticisms against 
structured products.  In order to accurately estimate the value it is necessary to decompose 
the packaged product, and evaluate the different components on an individual basis.  The 
sum of values of these separate instruments is then the value of the investment strategy as a 
whole.  In this section I will thus provide a brief introduction to the two most important 
building blocks of structured products; bonds and bank deposits and options.  The material in 
this section is based on McDonald (2006), Hull (2005) and Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2005).  
                                                 
5 Also called indexed bond 
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2.2.1 Bonds and bank deposits 
Bonds are also called fixed-income securities, and are a type of debt security issued by a 
borrower who is obligated to make specified payments to the holder over a pre-determined 
period (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2005).  There are two main groups of bonds; coupon bonds 
and zero-coupon bonds.  An investor holding a coupon bond will receive regular coupon 
payments over the life of the bond, as well as a repayment of the principal or face value of 
the investment at maturity.  Conversely, a zero-coupon bond will provide a payment of face 
value at maturity only (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2005).   
Structured products are most often based on either zero-coupon bonds or bank deposits, 
which can be valued using the same principles.  The price of a zero-coupon bond is shown in 
Equation 2-1 (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2005): 
 
Equation 2-1 
Where r is the interest rate and T is the time to maturity.  With continuous compounding the 
price is given by: 
 
  Equation 2-2 
Zero-coupon bonds are issued at prices considerably below face value since the investor‟s 
return comes solely from the difference between issue price and the payment of principal at 
maturity.  The interest or discount rate of the bond is based on the nominal risk-free rate 
which incorporates the real risk-free rate of return and a premium to compensate for 
expected inflation.  Since the bonds issued by the provider of the structured product are 
normally not riskless, the discount rate will also embody an additional premium which 
reflects both the default risk of the issuer and other bond-specific characteristics such as 
liquidity, tax attributes, and call risk.      
2.2.2 Options 
Derivatives are securities whose prices are derived from the prices of other securities.  
Options are one of the most common classes of derivatives, and are simply contracts that 
provide the buyer a right, but not an obligation, to perform some kind of specified action 
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(Hull J. C., 2005).  There are two main categories of options; a call option is a contract that 
gives the buyer the right to buy the underlying asset at a predetermined price, and similarly a 
put option gives the buyer the right to sell the underlying security.  Investors will either buy 
or sell (write) options.  The buyer of the option contract is holding a long position in the 
option, whereas the seller is holding a short position.  An investor who is holding a long call 
or a short put will benefit as the price of the underlying asset rises, whereas a short call and a 
long put profits as the price of the underlying decreases (McDonald, 2006).  
It is the buyer of the contract who is in control of the contract; the rights of the buyer are the 
obligations of the seller.  When a buyer profits from a contract, the seller will carry an 
equivalent loss.  Since the buyer decides whether or not to buy, the seller cannot make 
money at expiration.  In order to entice the seller to enter such a contract, the buyer must pay 
an initial price, or premium.  Thus we can think of the option contract as a method of buying 
or selling insurance against high or low asset prices (McDonald, 2006).  
The majority of structured products are designed so that the principal of the investment is 
protected all the while the investor partakes in some proportion of the gains of the 
underlying asset.  This is the equivalent of owning a zero-coupon bond while holding a long 
call option; the bond constitutes as such the guaranteed component, whereas the call option 
may or may not generate a positive return to the investor.  Although other option positions 
are rarely used as the only derivative component of structured products, they are more 
frequently used in combination with the long call, which enables the holder to achieve a 
payoff both if the price of the underlying increased or decreased beyond (or up to) a certain 
point (barrier).  A more detailed description of how barriers are designed can be found in 
McDonald (2006), and valuations of marketed products that includes barriers can be found in 
Bøe (2007) and Loven and Garås (2008).  Since the long call is the most important type of 
option in relation to structured investments, I will focus on this type when explaining the 
payoffs from options.  However, in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the 
long call it is important that the reader is familiar with the key terms used to describe 
options.  I have therefore provided a brief introduction to option terminology in Table 1 
which is based on McDonald (2006, p. 32). 
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Spot price The current market price of an asset. 
Strike price/ 
Exercise price 
The strike price is the contract price of the option contract, and is the 
amount that can be exchanged for the underlying asset. 
Exercise 
The act of exchanging the strike price for the underlying asset at the 
terms specified in the contract. 
Expiration 
The date by which the option must either be exercised or it becomes 
worthless. 
Exercise style 
The circumstances under which an option holder has the right to 
exercise an option.  The two most common exercise styles are 
“European” and “American”. 
European option An option that can only be exercised at expiration 
American option An option that may be exercised at any time during its life 
Table 1: Option terminology 
The long call 
The long position of a call option gives the owner the right, but not the obligation, to buy the 
underlying asset on or before the expiration date by paying the fixed exercise price.  As the 
buyer is not obligated to buy the underlying asset he will only exercise the option when the 
payoff is positive, that is, when the spot price at expiration is higher than the contract price 
(strike).  The algebraic expression for the payoff profile of a long call is thus (Hull J. C., 
2006): 
 
Equation 2-3 
Where CT is the payoff from the option at time T, ST is the spot price at maturity and K is the 
strike price of the option contract.  The payoff can be represented graphically as follows 
(Hull J. C., 2005): 
 Figure 3: Payoff from a long call 
Payoff 
ST 
K 
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The horizontal axis shows the spot price at time T, and the vertical axis shows the payoff at 
expiration.  When the current spot price is higher than the exercise price K, the buyer 
receives a positive payoff from the option, i.e. he buys the underlying asset from the option 
writer (seller) at the contract price K and receives a payoff by selling it immediately in the 
market.  The profit from the long call is determined by the initial premium that the buyer 
paid in order to obtain the contract (McDonald, 2006).  The size of this premium is the price 
of the call and can be determined (estimated) using several different option-pricing methods, 
some of which are further explained in chapter 2.3.  The call option profit is calculated by 
deducting the future value of the option premium from the payoff to the contract.  This is 
represented graphically in Figure 4 (McDonald, 2006):   
    
Asian options 
Asian options are frequently used in structured product design, and we will see later that the 
two DnB products were no exception.  The payoff of these options depends upon some 
average of the underlying asset prices over the life of the option.  Since the value of the 
option at expiration depends on the path by which the stock arrived at its final price, we say 
that Asian options are path-dependent (McDonald, 2006).  When the settlement of an option 
is based on the average price it is called an Asian tail; for instance a market-linked CD may 
have a payoff that is based on the average daily stock price over the last 30 days.  Asian tails 
are quite common in structured products as they reduce the volatility, and thus the value, of 
the option component – I will return to this issue in chapter 2.3.   
Payoff 
ST 
K 
FV of C0 
Figure 4: Profit on a long call 
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There are eight (2
3
) basic kinds of Asian options, depending on whether it is a call or a put, 
how the average is computed, and whether the average is used in place of the spot price of 
the underlying asset or the exercise price of the option (McDonald, 2006).  
The average can be defined either by arithmetic or geometric average.  Although arithmetic 
averages are most common in practice, they are mathematically inconvenient
6
.  The 
geometric average is much simpler in this regard, and there are easy pricing formulas for 
geometric Asian options.  The arithmetic average is defined as (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 
2005) 
 
Equation 2-4 
Here the stock price is recorded every h periods from time 0 to T, which means there are N = 
T / h periods.  The geometric average is defined as (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2005) 
 
Equation 2-5 
Asian options where the payoffs are dependent on the arithmetic average price of the 
underlying asset are the most common type of derivatives used in Norwegian structured 
products (Loven & Garås, 2008).  Since there are no closed-form approximation formulas 
for pricing arithmetic Asian options, it can be quite difficult to estimate their value – 
especially for an inexperienced private investor.  Monte Carlo simulation is one of the most 
common techniques used to evaluate these options, and I will explain this tool later in the 
paper.  
2.3 Valuing structured products 
Structured products can as I explained earlier be evaluated by analysing the different 
building blocks of the compound asset.  The valuation can be seen as a two-step process:  
First we need to analyse the prospectus and understand what components have been used to 
structure the security, i.e. we need to identify whether the product consist of a zero-coupon 
                                                 
6 Since the sum of lognormal variables is not lognormally distributed.  
 19 
bond, bank deposit, and the amount and type of derivatives used.  When we know what 
portfolio of individual asset would provide us with a cash flow identical in magnitude and 
timing to the cash flow from the structured product, we can take advantage of the most 
important yet commonsensical assumption of derivatives pricing; the idea that if two 
different investments generate the same payoff, they must have the same cost.  This is called 
no-arbitrage pricing, and implies that the market price of the structured product must equal 
the price of this replicating portfolio, which is the sum of the values of the individual 
financial assets in the portfolio.  If these price relationships do not hold there are possibilities 
for arbitrage, which means that profit can be generated without risk and with no net 
investment of funds (McDonald, 2006).    
Hence, if we understand how to value the individual components of the replicating portfolio 
we can value the structured product.  We already discussed the pricing of zero-coupon bonds 
in chapter 2.2.1, and in the next section we will see how options are most commonly valued, 
namely by using the Black-Scholes formula. 
2.3.1 The Black-Scholes formula for valuing options 
Fischer Black and Myron Scholes published in 1973 a paper that revolutionised the theory 
and practice of finance (McDonald, 2006).  They presented a formula, known as the Black-
Scholes formula, for computing the theoretical price of a European call stock option (Black 
& Scholes, 1973).  Later that year, Merton (1973) contributed to establishing the standard 
no-arbitrage restrictions on option prices, which significantly generalised the Black-Scholes 
formula.  It is outside the scope of this paper to explain the formula in detail, but detailed 
analysis can be found in Hull (2006) and McDonald (2006).  
The Black-Scholes formula for a European call option on a stock that pays dividends at the 
continuously compounded rate δ is (McDonald, 2006): 
 
Equation 2-6 
Where  
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The Black-Scholes formula makes a number of assumptions about both the economic 
environment and how the stock price is distributed (McDonald, 2006).  The formula assumes 
that the risk-free rate is known and constant, that there are no transaction costs or taxes, and 
that it is possible to borrow at the risk-free rate and short sell without accruing costs.  Further 
assumptions include that continuously compounded returns on the stock are normally 
distributed and independent over time; that the volatility of returns is known and constant; 
and future dividends are known.  Many of these assumptions can be relaxed, however, and 
the Black-Scholes formula is widely accepted as one of the most important models for option 
pricing (McDonald, 2006). 
Equation 2-6 gives the price of an option with a stock paying continuous dividends as the 
underlying asset.  The Black-Scholes formula can be expanded to calculate the price of 
options on stocks paying discrete dividends, futures and currencies; for a description of how 
this is done see for instance Bjerksund, Carlsen and Stensland‟s (1999) approach to valuing 
indexed bonds.  Next we will use the Black-Scholes formula to explore the factors that affect 
the value of an option, and thus the value of the structured product.  
2.3.2 Factors affecting option prices 
Distributors and producers in Norway have, as we will discuss more at a later stage, been 
accused of frequently including design features that reduces the value of structured products.  
If we are to understand how this is the case, we need to briefly discuss what factors influence 
the value of a structured product.  In Equation 2-6 we observe that there are six variables 
that affect the price of an option; the stock price, the strike price, time to expiration, 
volatility, the risk-free interest rate and dividends.  Table 2 presents a summary of the effect 
on the price of an option for an increase in each of these variables while the others remain 
fixed.  The table is from Hull (2005, p. 206). 
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Variable European call European put American call American put 
Current stock price + - + - 
Strike price - + - + 
Time to expiration ? ? + + 
Volatility + + + + 
Risk-free rate + - + - 
Dividends - + - + 
+/-/? indicates that an increase in the variable causes the option price to increase/decrease/relationship is uncertain. 
Table 2: Factors affecting option prices 
The current stock price and the strike price, S0 and K   
If a call option is exercised, the payoff is the amount by which the stock price exceeds the 
strike price.  The call option will thus become more valuable as the stock price increases and 
less valuable when the strike price is higher. 
The time to expiration, T 
An American call option becomes more valuable as the time to expiration increases, because 
time provides the option owner with more opportunities to exercise the option.  In the case of 
European calls, however, the effect is not always clear-cut.  While these options will 
normally become more valuable as the time to expiration increases, there are exceptions to 
the rule.  For instance, consider two options with a stock as the underlying asset; one which 
will expire in one month and the other in two months.  Suppose a large dividend is 
announced for payment six weeks from now.  The dividend payout will cause the stock price 
to decline at the ex-dividend date, and thus reduce the value of the two-month option relative 
to the shorter-lived one. 
The volatility of the underlying asset, σ 
Volatility measures the uncertainty of the return realised on an asset.  The chance that a 
share will do extraordinary well or exceptionally poorly becomes greater when volatility is 
higher.  These two outcomes normally offset each other for the owner of the stock, but this is 
not the case for an option owner.  The holder of a call benefits from the increased chance of 
abnormally high returns, but do not have to carry the extra down-side risk as the maximum 
loss on an option is limited to the price.  The value of a call option will therefore increase as 
volatility increases.   
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The risk-free interest rate, r 
When the interest rates in an economy increase, the required return investors tends to 
increase, while the present value of future cash flows received by the option holder 
decreases.  The two effects combined would normally increase the value of the call option.  
Note that the interest rate effect is explained under an „all else equal‟ assumption; a rise in 
interest rates would generally imply a fall in stock prices, and so the net effect could be to 
decrease the value of the call option.   
The dividends expected during the life of the option, δ 
The price of a call option is negatively related to the size of any expected dividends, as 
dividend reduce the stock price on the ex-dividend date. 
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3. The Norwegian structured product market 
The massive criticism regarding the design, marketing and sale of structured products is not 
a phenomenon purely related to the current financial crisis.  Several of Norway‟s most 
respected scholars in the area of financial economics voiced their concerns already in the late 
1990s, at a time when structured products were rapidly becoming one of the most popular 
investment classes of the mass market (Aasnes & Semmen, 1997; Bjerksund, Carlsen, & 
Stensland, 1999).  However, it was not until an increasing number of products approached 
maturity that the general opinion turned; a rise in public displeasure was seen as many 
products proved to be relatively poor investments.  This chapter will provide an overview of 
the history, size, and regulation of the Norwegian market for structured products.             
3.1 History of structured products in Norway 
Structured products were first introduced to the Norwegian market in the 1980s, when DnC 
and Bergen Bank offered bonds that included an option element to professional and 
institutional investors (Kredittilsynet, 2008).  The first market-linked bond was issued in 
April 1992 and was designed for professional or institutional investors.  The return was 
dependent on the development of the Dax 30 (Germany) and the S&P 500 (USA) indices, 
and the investor would lose capital should the return on the underlying be negative (Axelsen 
& Rakkestad, 1999).  The vast majority of bond issues directed towards private investors 
include a guarantee than ensures that the principal, or invested amount, is repaid at maturity.  
These types of products became available to the mass market in 1997, when among others 
DnB NOR and Nordea offered equity-linked deposits to private investors.  The majority of 
banks introduced structured products to their clients between 1998 and 2000.   
In a recent survey by the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, Kredittilsynet, banks 
generally reported that they were introduced to the concept of structured products by 
different product suppliers, for instance Terra and Pareto (Kredittilsynet, 2008).  DnB NOR 
was one of three banks that introduced these products on their own initiatives, after 
observing similar products in international markets.  Furthermore, Kredittilsynet found that 
out of 15 surveyed banks, only one bank reported that the decision to offer structured 
products were made by the board.  This decision was mainly taken by the CEO across the 
remainder of the sample.   
 24 
Over the years since first becoming available to the mass market, structured products quickly 
became one of the most popular investment strategies of private investors, who in 2006 
owned more than 90 per cent of outstanding investments in these products (Almklov, Tørum, 
& Skjæveland, 2006).  Figure 5 show the nominal value in millions of NOK of outstanding 
investments in structured products from December 2002 to December 2008 inclusive, based 
on numbers from Statistics Norway (SSB, 2009a; SSB, 2009b).  The red field represents 
indexed bonds whereas the blue field denotes market linked certificates of deposit.  We 
observe that the outstanding investment in indexed bonds was reasonably stable between 
2002 and 2005, but has declined sharply since March 2006.  Market-linked certificates of 
deposit experienced exceptional growth in the years 2002-2006.  Surprisingly, the value of 
outstanding investments stabilised first in December 2006, and remained relatively stable 
until March 2008 after which it has fallen rapidly.   
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Figure 5: Nominal value of outstanding investment in structured products 
 25 
The development in market-linked CDs is more obvious in Figure 6, which show the 
nominal value in MNOK of total outstanding investment between 2000 and 2008.  The 
investment for the years 2000-2002 are here interpolated based on Axelsen and Rakkestad 
(1999) and numbers from Statistics Norway (SSB, 2009a).       
Approximately 24.9 billion NOK are still invested in different structured products as of 
January 2009 (SSB, 2009a).  Kredittilsynet estimates that 80 per cent of the total investment 
is geared, that is, loan-financed (Kredittilsynet, 2008).  The proportion of outstanding 
investments in structured products that is debt-financed is shown in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7: Proportion of products that are debt financed 
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The data is collected from the SSB website (SSB, 2009c).  The figure shows that the banks 
have debt financed more than 100 per cent of protected equity notes sold; the reason for this 
being that daughters or branches of foreign banks in Norway
7
 lend to investors buying notes 
issued by other divisions of the corporation.   
According to the Norwegian Consumer Council (Forbrukerrådet) the gearing of structured 
products is a fairly Norwegian phenomenon, and while similar products have been sold by 
banks in Sweden and Denmark they have not offered loan-financing in conjunction with the 
investment (Forbrukerrådet, 2009a).  In a meeting with the Swedish Banker‟s Association in 
April 2008, representatives from the two banks Swedbank and Handelsbanken were 
questioning whether the idea of structuring products disappear if the investment is geared.  
This has been one of the major criticisms against the sale of these products in Norway.  Most 
banks have offered to finance up to 100 per cent of the invested amount, arguing that gearing 
the investment increases the potential for high returns.  I show how we can expand the 
example from Figure 2 to include the effects of debt-financing in Figure 8.  The presentation 
assumes that the investor has borrowed 100 per cent of the payment required for the 
investment, and that there are no fees involved in acquiring the loan
8
.  The interest on the 
loan is 6 per cent, and the product and loan expires in 5 years.  The investor will borrow 104 
from the bank, use 4 to cover product transaction fees and 100 to invest in the actual product.  
Again, 78.35 is invested in a 5 per cent zero-coupon bond, and 21.65 is used to purchase 
options.  At maturity the bond will pay 100, the loan repayment is 139.18
9
, and the payoff 
from the option is uncertain.  From the figure it becomes clear that the investor require a 
cash flow of nearly 40 from the options in order to break even.  This constitutes an 81 per 
cent return from the option over the 5 year investment period, which equals a 12.6 per cent 
p.a. return
10
.   
                                                 
7 Such as Nordea (daughter of foreign bank) and Fokus (branch of foreign banks) 
8 In practice the bank frequently charge a fee for providing the loan. 
9  
10  
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Financing structured products have been viewed as a particularly profitable activity for the 
banks.  The default risk is limited to interest payments only, since a high proportion of the 
borrowed amount is placed in a bank deposit or zero-coupon bond.  Nonetheless, most banks 
have still charged a considerable interest margin on these loans (Koekebakker & 
Zakamouline, 2006; Bøe, 2007; Johnsen, 2008).  
In addition to the problem of debt-financing structured products, two more issues have been 
subject to heavy criticism.  The first problem is that the products are designed and built in 
such a way that it is very difficult for the investor to accurately evaluate the product that is 
+ 
Investor’s payment 
104 
 
Invested amount 
100 
104 
 
Transaction fees 
4 
 
Bank deposit (5%) 
78.35 
 
Options 
21.65 
 
Deposit at maturity: 
100 
 
Options at maturity: 
Max ( ?, 0)  
 
Return  
100 + ?? 
 
Bank loan 
104 
 
Loan repayment 
139.18 
 
Total return 
-39.18 + ?? 
 
Figure 8: Debt-financing a structured product 
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being purchased.  Analyses in several master theses from NHH show that pricing structured 
products is relatively demanding, and it is unreasonable to except that the average private 
investor have the necessary financial background and theoretical knowledge to estimate the 
correct price on these products (Bøe, 2007; Loven & Garås, 2008; Solvær, Steinnes, & 
Stølen, 2005; Haugo, 2007).  Furthermore, experts have argued that banks have offered 
unnecessary complicated products in order to both confuse customers with respect to the real 
value of the investment package, and to present complex elements as both safer and more 
profitable than what they really are (Staavi, 2006).  Several academic analyses have shown 
that the theoretical price of the option-element of structured products is much lower than 
what has been declared in the product prospectuses (Bjerksund, 2008; Solvær, Steinnes, & 
Stølen, 2006; Koekebakker & Zakamouline, Forventet avkastning på 
aksjeindeksobligasjoner, 2006; Lie, Lindset, & Lund, 2005) – this constitutes a hidden fee or 
margin beneficial to the supplier.  A change in the regulation in 2006 ensured that the 
product provider is obligated to inform of the size of this hidden fee in its marketing 
materials (Kredittilsynet, 2006), however it is still uncertain whether these sizes accurately 
represent the fees that the customer truly pays (Bøe, 2007; Loven & Garås, 2008).     
The second issue relates to the marketing and sale of the products.  Experts argue that 
product providers have taken advantage of the product complexity and financial illiteracy of 
their customers in the sale of structured products (Ormseth, 2007).  The product prospectus 
often promises a return equivalent to the stock market, at a risk that compares to a normal 
bank account – which is at best an inadequate representation of reality.  While structured 
products if designed appropriately can be useful hedging instruments and interesting 
investment strategies for the right investor, product providers have incorporated design 
elements that have a negative impact on the value of the packaged product.  One important 
feature of the design is that the underlying index is nearly always a pure price index, which 
implies that it is not adjusted for dividends.  If the investment was actually placed in the 
underlying index the investor would receive the dividends as they accrued, but the holder of 
an option does not actually own the stock and will as such not receive dividend payments.  
Dividends are thus an expense to the option owner, and will therefore reduce the value of the 
packaged product.   
We have seen that the value of an option is dependent on volatility, which is why many 
product providers incorporate features that reduce volatility in the design of structured 
products.  A common example is the use of Asian tails where the strike price or the price at 
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expiration is calculated as an average of a pre-specified number of observations.  Averaging 
reduces the volatility of the stock price at expiration, and thus the value of the average 
structured product decreases with the number of stock prices used to compute the average 
(McDonald, 2006). 
In most Norwegian banks the sale of structured products has been carried out by financial 
advisers that should more accurately be referred to as sellers (Døskeland, 2009).  Critiques 
have questioned whether many of these sellers posit the necessary knowledge or 
comprehension to explain how investor‟s return is calculated at expiration, or how the 
products can be priced and evaluated.  Examples of aggressive selling to credulous 
customers have frequently been quoted in the media and some financial advisers have even 
been known to visit homes for the elderly in order to find potential investors 
(Finansdepartementet, 2009; Bergo, 2007; Berge & Forseth, 2009).   These advisers have 
furthermore often received volume-dependent bonuses when selling structured products 
(Kredittilsynet, 2008).   
With the introduction of new regulation we have seen an improvement both in what 
information is included in prospectuses and how this information is presented (Loven & 
Garås, 2008).  However, the majority of issues that have expired to date were not covered by 
these regulatory changes, and many customers are lodging complaints both with the 
supplying banks and with Bankklagenemnda. The prevailing litigation involving DnB NOR 
is expected to be of great importance to many private investors around the country, and some 
experts have estimated that class actions and customer compensations will cost Norwegian 
banks more than 14 billion NOK (Stranden, 2009).  I will provide a brief summary of 
relevant regulation later in this chapter, and I will also present the details involved in the 
case of the two DnB NOR products.  However before discussing these issues let us briefly 
look at the realised return on structured products marketed in Norway over the last decade.      
3.1.1 Realised return on structured products 
Over the last few years several academic analyses and reports have shown that both the 
expected and realised return on the structured products offered in the Norwegian market 
have been dismal.  Kredittilsynet asked 15 banks to report realised return on every product 
that was issued and matured before the third quarter of 2007 (Kredittilsynet, 2008).  The 
banks were required to report the return for investments that were 100% equity financed, and 
 30 
for investments that was debt financed with 80%.  The number of observations reported was 
350 for equity financed products, and 218 for leveraged investments.  
The respondents reported an arithmetic average return of approximately 4% per annum for 
the investments that were equity financed, however the spread of returns was significant, as 
portrayed in Figure 9 
 
Figure 9: Realised return equity financing, not including transaction costs. 
The figure shows that 137 of the products or nearly 40% had an annual return of 0% and 
lower, whereas 62% of the products (218 observations) had a return below 5% cent per 
annum
11
.  In comparison, the average interest rate on a 5-year governmental bond for the 
period 1997-2007 was 5.24% per annum (Norges Bank, 2009).  Most of the structured 
products that were included in the survey had a limited downside risk, since the principal of 
the investment was guaranteed through a certificate of deposit or zero-coupon bond; this 
explains the relatively short tail on the left-hand side of the distribution.  Transaction fees 
                                                 
11 The products reported in the survey expired between 2001 and 2007, and was issued after 1997. 
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normally amount to between 1 - 4% of invested amount dependent on product, volume and 
customer relationship, and have not been included in the diagram. 
The reported arithmetic average return on leveraged structured products was 2% per annum.  
The distribution of returns on products financed with 80% debt capital is shown in Figure 
10. 
 
Figure 10: Realised return on equity for 80 per cent leveraged investment in 
structured products, not including transaction costs. 
The figure shows that 118 out of 218 or approximately 54% of products had zero or negative 
yearly return.  Nearly 14% of products had a return on equity above 30%, while 5% of 
products suffered losses of more than -30% per annum
12
.  Returns would have been slightly 
lower if transaction costs were included in the diagram.  The diagram further reflects the fact 
that leveraged structured products have the potential for returning high returns, in 
accordance with what banks have argued when defending the sale of structured products.  
However, debt-financing also increases the chance of significant losses when product return 
                                                 
12 These were likely products where only a proportion of the invested amount was guaranteed through the bond/deposit 
element. 
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is zero or negative, and many believe that banks in general have not adequately informed 
their customers in this respect (Bjerksund, 2008).     
Koekebakker and Zakamouline (2007) found that the arithmetic average return for 270 
indexed bonds that expired in the period between 1997 and 2007 was 2.16% per annum, 
whereas the geometric average was 1.58%.  Only 36.3% of the bonds had a positive total 
return, and hence 63.7% of products expired worthless during the period.  The divergence in 
the numbers reported by Kredittilsynet (2008) and Koekebakker and Zakamouline (2007) is 
probably related to differences in the methodologies employed.  Koekebakker and 
Zakamouline received extensive criticism from DnB NOR, which have claimed that the 
methodology is erroneous, particularly with respect to the bench-mark evaluation of the 
products.  See Brattlie, Kleiven and Jordheim (2007) and Koekebakker and Zakamouline 
(2007) for more on this quarrel.  
3.2 Regulation of the market 
The above discussion of realised return on structured products implies that these financial 
instruments probably did not constitute appropriate investment strategies for the average 
investor.  When we also consider that banks were simultaneously operating as distributors 
and advisers we sense that there is a strong need for regulation in the market.  The Financial 
Supervisory Authority of Norway (Kredittilsynet) has received criticism for reacting to 
slowly to the unfavourable practices in relation to the sale of structured products, and it was 
only after a sustained pressure from the media and independent experts that Kredittilsynet 
finally acknowledged the serious problems in this market (Ørjasæter, 2009).    In this section 
I will briefly present the changes in relation to regulating the structured product market, and 
how recent actions from regulators have practically put a stop to the sale of these products.   
The first Circular issued by Kredittilsynet (No. 4/2004) contained guidelines on what 
information should be disclosed in connection with the sale of structured products.  
However, a Circular only describes the recommended norms, and does not as such have 
regulatory power.  This issue was later replaced by Circular No. 15/2006, which furthermore 
included guidelines on and documentation requirements of the investment advice service in 
relation to the sale of these products (Høgsand, 2008; Kredittilsynet, No. 15/2006).  
Kredittilsynet issued simultaneously amendments to the Regulations concerning financial 
institutions‟ sale and advisory services regarding structured products, which came into effect 
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January 1, 2007.  The new legislation focuses on investor protection corresponding to the 
Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), which harmonised the regulatory regime 
for investment services across the European Economic Area member states (Kleven, 2008).  
The purpose of these regulatory actions was to provide consumers with more and better 
information in relation to several aspects of structured products, including expected return, 
risk elements and inherent costs (Høgsand, 2008).   
The regulatory actions so far did not however prevent the banks from selling debt financed 
structured products to unsuitable investors (Sparre M. R., 2009d), and Kredittilsynet found it 
necessary to issue another Circular (No. 4/2008), which informed financial institutions about 
changes to the current regulation on the duty of disclosure in relation to the sale of structured 
products.  The amendments made the sale of structured products more difficult by posing a 
number of new requirements on the banks, including that these and other complex products 
should not be sold to customers who cannot be regarded as professional investors.  
Kredittilsynet also advised the financial institutions against offering debt financing when 
selling structured products, based on the “historically low returns on equity capital and the 
risk of significant losses for the customers on this form of financing” (Kredittilsynet, No. 
4/2008).  As expected, the new Circular led to a considerable reduction in the sale of 
structured products to the general public, and a large number of banks have now stopped the 
sale, distribution and debt financing of these products (Kleven, 2008). 
3.3 Structured product trends 
When Kredittilsynet conducted its survey in late 2007, nearly 90 per cent of the banks were 
still offering structured products, however Circular 4/2008 that came into effect on March 1, 
2008 limited as we have seen the banks‟ opportunity to sell these these products.  This 
regulation, as well as the substantial negative attention structured products have received in 
the media, has put a full stop to the popularity of these products in Norway.  However, the 
banks have been quick to come up with alternative products, most notably so-called 
warrants, to compensate for the lost income.  The similarities to the conventional structured 
products are striking, especially when considering that a warrant is a call option written by a 
company on its own stock
13
.  When warrants are exercised the company issues more of its 
                                                 
13 The term also refers more generally to an option issued in fixed supply. 
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own stock and sells them to the option holder at the strike price.  While this new invention 
are not covered to the same extent as the protected equity note and market-linked CDs in the 
current regulation, it is still very complex instrument, and potential investors should exercise 
caution when offered to buy such products.  For more on warrants see for example Loven 
and Garås (2008), McDonald (2006) or Hull (2005). 
 35 
4. Evaluating DnB Global and DnB Sektor using 
the Monte Carlo simulation technique 
In the two previous chapters I presented a framework for understanding options and 
structured products, and provided an overview of the Norwegian structured product market.  
These two chapters should enable the reader to understand and analyse a real world case, 
namely the high profile debate concerning the two structured products DnB Global and DnB 
Sektor 2000/2006; two products which have received particular focus in Norway over the 
last couple of years.  In the next chapter I will use the results obtained to illustrate the issue 
of asymmetric information in the structured product market. 
In 2006, Koekebakker and Zakamouline (2006) used the Monte Carlo method to analyse two 
structured products and found that the expected return on debt financed investments were 
negative.  DnB Global and Sektor represented typical structured products; they seemed 
neither specifically poorly designed nor extraordinary complicated as far as structured 
products go.  Armed with the conclusions from Koekebakker and Zakamouline, private 
investor Ivar Petter Røeggen raised a complaint to Bankklagenemnda, who only after 
pressure from the Minister of Finance Kristin Halvorsen agreed to hear the case.  Because of 
the complexity involved, Bankklagenemnda named an independent expert, Professor Thore 
Johnsen, to assist in the evaluation of the two products.  A conclusion was reached only 
earlier this year, when Bankklagenemnda decided in favour of the client, recommending that 
the bank restore him to his original financial position.  The bank has decided not to comply 
with Bankklagenemnda‟s recommendation and Røeggen, with the assistance of the 
Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman (Forbrukerrådet), is currently preparing a court case 
against DnB NOR.  It is expected that the case will be pursued all the way to the Supreme 
Court (Andersson, 2009; Sparre M. R., -Skal bli moro å kjøre dem i retten, 2009c).   
In this chapter I will discuss the characteristics of the two products, before analysing how 
first Koekebakker and Zakamouline, and later DnB NOR Markets and Thore Johnsen 
evaluated these products, with a particular focus on the choices of input parameters.  I will 
then explain how the Monte Carlo simulation technique can be applied to value structured 
products, before I apply this model using the parameters chosen by DnB and Johnsen.  The 
results are discussed in section 4.4.   
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4.1 The products 
 DnB Global and DnB Sektor 2000/2006 are two protected equity notes issued on November 
24, 2000 by Den norske Bank ASA with expiration on November 24, 2006.  The two notes 
combine a zero-coupon bond issued at par value, and a long position in a call option.  At 
expiration the bond holder receives the principal and an additional return dependent on the 
development in the underlying stock index (DnB Markets, 2000a; DnB Markets, 2000b).   
The underlying asset of the DnB Global 2000/2006 index bond is a basket of three stock 
indices as presented in Table 3: 
Area/country: Sub index: Weight: 
Europe Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 0.50 
USA Standard & Poor‟s 500 Index 0.25 
Japan Nikkei 225 0.25 
Table 3: Underlying indices of DnB Global 2000/2006 
The additional return on DnB Global is calculated by multiplying the principal P with the 
return factor RF and the weighted sum of the relative changes in the sub indices DJ Euro 
Stoxx50, S&P 500 and Nikkei 225.  The relative change of each index is given by the 
difference between the value at expiration T and value when issued t, divided by the issue 
value.  If the weighted sum of the relative changes in the three sub indices is negative, the 
return is set to zero.  The algebraic expression for this return is given in Equation 4-1 (DnB 
Markets, 2000a): 
  
Equation 4-1 
The value at time t of each sub index is determined by the arithmetic average of the values 
over two trading days; 24 November 2000 and 22 December 2000.  The value at time T is 
defined as the arithmetic average of 13 monthly observations of the index value between 
November 2005 and November 2006 inclusive.  The return factor is 105 per cent (1.05).   
The underlying index of the DnB Sektor 2000/2006 index bond is a basket of three stock 
indices as described in Table 4: 
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Sector: Sub index: Weight: 
Healthcare Dow Jones STOXX Healthcare 1/3 
Telecommunications Dow Jones STOXX Telecom 1/3 
Bank Dow Jones EURO STOXX Bank 1/3 
Table 4: Underlying indices of DnB Sektor 2000/2006 
As in the previous case, the additional return on DnB Sektor is calculated by multiplying the 
principal P with the return factor RF and the weighted sum of the relative changes in the sub 
indices DJ Stoxx Healthcare, DJ Stoxx Telecom and DJ Euro Stoxx Bank.  If the weighted 
sum of the relative changes in the three sub indices is negative, the return is set to zero.  The 
algebraic expression for this return is given in Equation 4-2 (DnB Markets, 2000b). 
  
Equation 4-2 
 The value at time t of each sub index is determined by the arithmetic average of the values 
over three trading days; 24 November 2000, 22 December 2000 and 24 January 2001.  The 
value at time T is defined as the arithmetic average of 19 monthly observations of the index 
value between May 2005 and November 2006 inclusive.  The return factor is 100 per cent 
(1.0).   
The underlying indices for both Global and Sektor are price indices only, and are as such not 
adjusted for dividends.  The returns on the indices are further calculated in local currency, 
which ensures that the investor is not exposed to currency risk.   
The transaction fee is dependent on customer relationship and volume as shown in Table 5.  
The fee is determined based on the total investment if the customer purchased both products.  
The note was sold in shares of NOK 10,000.  
Invested amount Ordinary 
customers 
Program 
customers From To 
NOK 10,000 NOK 1,000,000 4.50 % 3.75 % 
NOK 1,010,000 NOK 2,000,000 3.50 % 2.90 % 
NOK 2,010,000 NOK 3,000,000 2.50 % 2.10 % 
NOK 3,010,000 NOK 5,000,000 1.50 % 1.00 % 
NOK 5,010,000 ∞ 0.50 % 0.40 % 
Table 5: Transaction fees for DnB Global and DnB Sektor 2000/2006 from (DnB 
Markets, 2000a). 
DnB Global and Sektor are representative examples of structured products marketed in 
Norway at the start of the century (Lindset, 2008).  The products are designed with price 
averages both at the start and at the end of the investment periods, and take as such 
advantage of both time and asset diversification in attempts to decrease volatility.  In 2006, 
Koekebakker and Zakamouline was the first to conduct and publish results from a thorough 
examination of these two products, and I will now present the results from their analysis. 
4.1.1 Estimating expected return: Koekebakker and Zakamouline 
Only a limited number of academic analyses had been conducted on the return potential of 
structured products marketed in Norway before Koekebakker and Zakamouline presented 
their results in 2006.  They found that the expected returns of the two products tested, DnB 
Global and DnB Sektor, were only marginally higher than the risk-free rate.  Gearing the 
products would cause the investor‟s expected return to be negative, that is, according to the 
authors‟ estimations investors would on average lose money when buying these guaranteed 
products. 
In their analysis, Koekebakker and Zakamouline (2006) used the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique, which I shall return to later in this chapter.  In order to estimate the expected 
return, the authors had to make assumptions on the values of a range of different parameters; 
the risk-free rate in Norway and in relevant foreign countries, the interest rate on loans, as 
well as the expected return (risk premium and dividend yield), volatility and correlation of 
the relevant underlying indices.  I will now briefly explain the assumptions underlying this 
analysis, before presenting the results achieved. 
Assumptions about the expected returns 
Risk premium:  Koekebakker and Zakamouline (2006) base their assumptions of expected 
returns on the underlying indices on the data on historical risk premiums presented by 
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Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2000) in The Millennium book – a century of investment 
returns.  The geometric average risk premium in the period between 1900 and 2000 in USA 
and Japan was 5.8% and 6.7% respectively.  The weighted geometric average risk premium 
for a group of European countries
14
 for the same period was 5.3%.  Koekebakker and 
Zakamouline (2006) use these numbers as the future expected risk premium, but emphasise 
that these are fairly high estimates, as the risk premium in general have decreased after the 
Second World War due to (among other factors) decreasing political risk.  
The risk premiums for the industry specific indices underlying the DnB Sektor bond was 
estimated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (see for instance Bodie, Kane and Marcus 
(2005), chapter 9).  The relevant beta (β) estimates were based on 60 monthly observations 
of the sub indices and market portfolio prior to November 2000.  The risk premiums for 
STOXX Healthcare, STOXX Telecom and STOXX Bank were 4.23%, 5.72% and 5.56% 
respectively.  
Dividend yield:  The estimates for dividend yields are based on monthly observations for the 
last 5 years prior to November 2000 for the different country and industry indices, and lies 
within the range 0.9% to 2.84%
15
. 
Expected return:  The total expected return is then calculated by subtracting the expected 
dividend yield from the sum of the relevant risk-free rate and the risk premium for each sub 
index.  Koekebakker and Zakamouline (2006) assumes an expected per annum return of 
8.58% for Euro STOXX50, 10.27% for the S&P 500 and 6.15% for the Nikkei225.  STOXX 
Healthcare, Telecom and Bank have expected returns of 8.15%, 9.12% and 8.07% 
respectively. 
Assumptions about correlation and volatility 
The estimates for volatility σi and correlation ρij between the different sub-indices was again 
based on historical numbers; the last 60 monthly observations prior to the issuance of the 
bond.  Koekebakker and Zakamouline‟s estimates can be found in Table 6: 
 
                                                 
14 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
15 The dividend yield for each index is presented in Table 7 later in the chapter.   
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  Correlation Volatility 
Global Euro STOXX50 S&P 500 Nikkei 225 σ 
Euro STOXX50 1.0000 
 
  19.16% 
S&P 500 0.6689 1.0000   16.26% 
Nikkei 225 0.4017 0.5092 1.0000 20.36% 
    
 
    
Sektor STOXX Healthcare STOXX Telecom STOXX Bank   
STOXX Healthcare 1.0000 
 
  19.97% 
STOXX Telecom 0.5048 1.0000   22.36% 
STOXX Bank 0.6342 0.6204 1.0000 20.36% 
Table 6: K&Z's assumptions about correlation and volatility 
Results 
Koekebakker and Zakamouline completed 100,000 iterations in their simulations, and found 
that the expected return on an equity financed investment is 7.72% and 7.16% for Global and 
Sektor respectively, at the 4.5% transaction fee level (investments up to NOK 1,000,000).  If 
the investor only pays 0.5% of the invested amount in transaction fees, the expected per 
annum returns are 8.42% and 7.90%.  In comparison, the rate on a risk-free governmental 
bond for the same period was 6.30%, meaning that the products had expected risk premiums 
of 0.9% and 2.1%.  The authors also show the effects of gearing the two products; the 
expected return when 100% debt financed was -1.31% for Global and -1.84% for Sektor 
including a 4.5% transaction fee.  Hence, the investors should expect to lose money on 
average when investing in the two products.      
The results from Koekebakker and Zakamouline have been critically important in the 
complaint against DnB to Bankklagenemnda, and are likely to play a key role also in the 
upcoming court case.     
4.1.2 Estimating expected return: DnB NOR Markets 
In a letter to Bankklagenemnda 4 July 2007, DnB NOR Markets conducted their own 
analysis and valuation of the two structured products (Johnsen, 2008)
16
. DnB does not give 
an explanation of the models employed to evaluate the products, but the parameters chosen 
are as follows: 
                                                 
16 I have not been able to access this document, however it is thoroughly presented in Johnsen (2008) and my analysis is 
thus based on his discussions. 
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Interest rates: The interest rates chosen by DnB are only marginally different from 
Koekebakker and Zakamouline; the latter choose to base the analysis on 6-year government 
bond yields, whereas the former employs swap rates.  DnB use a NOK swap rate of 6.77% 
per annum, and a weighted average foreign rate of 4.77% for Global and 5.44% for Sektor.  
The interest rates on loans to finance the investments are set to 8.51%. 
Dividend yield: While Koekebakker and Zakamouline use historical 5-year dividend yields, 
DnB argue that the yield over the last 12-months prior to the issue date is more relevant, 
since the short term rates are more relevant than historical rates when evaluating the size of 
future dividends.  DnB estimates the weighted average dividend yield for Global and Sektor 
to 0.96% and 1.97% respectively. 
Risk premiums: DnB derive arithmetic continuously compounded risk premiums from their 
assumption on index volatility, by assuming a constant Sharpe ratio
17
 of 0.25, meaning that 
the excess returns on the underlying index portfolios are related to the risk of the portfolio. 
Converting the continuously compounded returns to p.a. returns DnB employs an annual 
arithmetic risk premium of 6.38% for Global and 7.82% for Sektor.  The equivalent 
geometric premiums are 3.45% and 3.49% respectively. 
Volatility: Koekebakker and Zakamouline use historic volatility and correlations for the last 
5 years prior to the issuance of the bonds.  DnB on the other hand, argue that implicit 
volatility is more relevant when valuing the products, that is, the volatility that reflects the 
market price of the options.  The bank asserts that the implicit volatility of the options they 
purchased were 23.6% for Global and 28.6% for Sektor, which are fairly high numbers from 
an historical point of view.   
Results 
DnB Markets report an expected return of 10.19% (9.48%) and 10.54% (9.82%) per annum 
for transaction fees of 0.50% (4.50%) for Global and Sektor respectively for an equity 
financed investment.  For leveraged investments (100% debt financing), they estimate the 
expected annual return to 2.48% (1.50%) for Global and 2.98% (2.02%) for Sektor.      
                                                 
17 The Sharpe ratio is expressed as  
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4.1.3 Estimating expected return: Johnsen 
The two valuations presented to Bankklagenemnda so far report highly contradictory 
expected returns on the two products, confirming the fact that structured products are 
complex instruments which are difficult for the average investor to evaluate.  Since none of 
the members of Bankklagenemnda had the required knowledge to financially analyse the 
product prospectuses
18
, they called on an external, objective expert to make a thorough 
analysis on their behalf.  Thore Johnsen, professor in finance at NHH was thus brought in to 
assist Bankklagenemnda in their decision making process, and his case report was submitted 
in August 2008.  In the following section I will present the assumptions and results obtained 
by Johnsen, but first let us examine the model he used to evaluate the products since the 
choice of model can greatly influence the results obtained.  
The model 
Johnsen (2008) employs a simplified analytical model when estimating the expected return 
on the two products.  The model is developed from the notion that the price of the call option 
 is equal to the discounted value of the expected option return at maturity , using the 
appropriate risk-adjusted interest rate : 
 
Equation 4-3 
Where 
 
Equation 4-4 
Where  is the value of the index at maturity expressed as a percentage of the initial value, 
and where the asterisk denotes that both the starting and maturity values may have been 
calculated as an average of several observations.  The discounting rate equals the Norwegian 
risk free rate plus a risk premium that reflects the systematic risk of the option return.   is 
the effective time to maturity, which is shorter than the nominal time to maturity because of 
the average prices employed.  Assuming that the stock prices follow a lognormal stochastic 
process, the expected return on the option is 
                                                 
18 In fact, Bankklagenemnda first deemed that such evaluations were too complicated for the board members and thus 
declined to hear the case, but changed their minds after pressure from the Minister of Finance Kristin Halvorsen. 
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Equation 4-5 
Where  is the cumulative normal distribution; the expected return on the stock index (in 
percentage of the initial value) is given by 
 
Equation 4-6 
Where  
 
 
The expected yearly return on the index equals the total return  adjusted for 
the dividend yield,  is the risk free rate and RP is the arithmetic risk premium for the 
underlying index.  The volatility for the index is scaled using the effective maturity.   
While this simplified model is useful in estimating the expected return on the products from 
the investor‟s perspective, Johnsen acknowledge that it is inadequate when evaluating how 
the bank initially priced the options.  For instance, Equation 4-6 would require knowledge 
about the bank‟s perception of the risk premium RP and dividend yield δ of the index.  Thus, 
when evaluating the price and implicit costs of the two products, Johnsen employs standard 
option pricing theory and the Black & Scholes formula.   
When calibrating his model against the parameters chosen by Koekebakker and 
Zakamouline, Johnsen (2008) finds that his model generates consistently higher expected 
returns (0.80% and 0.72%) than their simulation results.  He attributes the difference to the 
assumption of additive lognormality.  The model provides consistently lower returns than 
those reported by DnB NOR Markets, however the difference is relatively small being 
approximately -0.2% and -0.4% for Global and Sektor respectively.  Johnsen (2008) further 
argue that out of the difference in results between Koekebakker/Zakamouline and DnB NOR 
Markets, approximately one percentage point of the difference in reported expected returns 
are attributed to the model employed. 
I have explained the model chosen and how it may affect the results produced.  Let us know 
turn to the assumptions and parameters employed by Johnsen in his analysis. 
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The assumptions 
Interest rates: Johnsen based his expected return estimates for the two products on DnB 
NOR‟s swap rates, as he believes that these were most likely used at the initial pricing of the 
products.   
Dividend yield:  Johnsen agreed to some extent with DnB NOR‟s argument that short term 
dividend yields are more important than longer term ones, but emphasised that this assumes 
that the investor is more concerned with a short term future dividend yield.  Since dividend 
yields were unusually low in 2000 because of the dot-com bubble and the investment period 
was 6 years, Johnsen argued that a normal historical level for expected dividend yields is 
more relevant.  He thus used a dividend yield of 1.5% for Global and 2.0% for Sektor. 
Risk premium:  Johnsen used a geometrical risk premium of 3.0% for Global and 2.7% for 
Sektor.  The premiums were found by scaling the widely accepted 3% long term geometric 
risk premium for the global market portfolio according to the weighted beta β values for 
Global and Sektor of 1 and 0.9 respectively. 
Volatility and correlation: While Johnsen agreed that implicit volatility is in many cases 
more relevant than historic volatility, he commented that the volatility levels employed by 
DnB are high.  In an appendix he showed that the Global and Sektor portfolios have 
experienced a significant reduction in overall volatility relative to that of the underlying 
indices in the previous 6-year period because of consistently low correlations between the 
indices.  Since the indices have experienced increasing volatility over the couple of years, 
Johnsen regarded 18% and 22% volatility for Global and Sektor respectively to be relatively 
realistic estimates for the expected future implicit volatility. 
In an appendix, Johnsen graphed the development in 6-year correlation between the 
underlying indices from 1993 onwards.  His calculations for the Global portfolio in 
particular are significantly lower than the 5-year historic correlations estimated by 
Koekebakker and Zakamouline.  Johnsen‟s results yield 6-year correlations of approximately 
0.39 and 0.28 between EuroSTOXX 50 and the S&P 500 and Nikkei 225 indices 
respectively, and a correlation of 0.06 between S&P 500 and Nikkei 225.  These graphs are 
shown in Appendix 1.   
Results 
Johnsen (2008) found that the annual expected return for 0.5% and 4.5% transaction fee is 
7.77% and 7.07% for Global and 7.82% and 7.12% for Sektor when the investment is equity 
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financed.  The expected return on a fully leveraged investment is -1.13% and -2.32% per 
annum for Global and -1.05% and -2.23% for Sektor.  Thus, Johnsen supports the results by 
Koekebakker and Zakamouline that the expected return on debt financed investments is 
negative.   
4.1.4 A comment on the methodologies employed 
Johnsen (and most likely DnB NOR Markets
19
) through the adaption of simplified models 
assume that the distribution of returns for both Global and Sektor is lognormal, whereas 
Koekebakker and Zakamouline only assume lognormality for the three sub-indices included 
in each of the two products.  The sum of lognormal distributions is not necessarily 
lognormal, and Johnsen‟s argue that both his and DnB NOR‟s estimations overvalue the 
price and the expected return for the two products relative to Koekebakker and 
Zakamouline‟s simulation results, because simplified models are used in the analyses.  Any 
model implemented in order to analyse structured products is sensitive to the assumptions 
made when identifying the relevant input parameters in the model.  However, we have seen 
that the final result from the analysis can also be highly sensitive to the model employed.  
Thus, it would be useful to see whether the results provided by Johnsen and DnB Markets 
really overestimate the expected return on the two equity protected notes, and the likely size 
of this overrating.  The Monte Carlo simulation technique is widely regarded as the most 
accurate method for evaluating complex derivatives such as the option component of many 
structured products (Boyle P. P., 1977; Hull J. C., 2006; McDonald, 2006); so the question 
arises of whether the parameters chosen by DnB Markets in particular would continue to 
generate positive expected returns when used in a Monte Carlo simulation? Another 
important aspect is to see what the probability distribution of these returns would look like.  
If the simulation would yield negative expected returns it would seriously weaken the bank‟s 
position and argument in the upcoming court case.  I will provide the result from my 
simulations based on DnB‟s input parameters shortly, but I will first provide a thorough 
explanation of the Monte Carlo method in order for the reader to understand why this 
particular method is believed superior in the area of complex option pricing. 
                                                 
19 Johnsen calibrates his model against the parameters employed by DnB NOR and find that his model produces 
consistently lower expected returns than the model adapted by the bank.  The differences are however quite small; about 
0.2% for Global and 0.4% for Sektor. 
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4.2 Monte Carlo simulation 
Monte Carlo simulations were first developed and used by physicists as a method of 
measuring the characteristics of neutrons in 1930 (Husebø, 2002).  Monte Carlo methods 
have since then found wide application in a range of different fields, including chemistry, 
design and visuals, telecommunication, games, mathematics and finance.  In finance the 
method is used to price assets whose prices are not readily determined by analytical means 
(Benninga, 2008).  In 1977, Boyle (1977) developed a Monte Carlo simulation method for 
solving option valuation problems.  The method provided a useful supplement to the 
approaches proposed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Cox and Ross (1976).  Monte Carlo 
simulation is particularly useful in relation to the valuation of path-dependent options, such 
as Asian and barrier options, whose price depends not only on the terminal value of the 
underlying asset, but also on the path of the prices by which the terminal price was reached 
(Benninga, 2008).   
The Monte Carlo method for option pricing involves simulating future stock prices using a 
random number generator.  These simulated prices are then used to compute the discounted 
expected value of the option.  Monte Carlo valuation is performed using the risk-neutral 
distribution, meaning that we assume assets on average earn the risk-free rate, and we then 
discount the expected payoff using the risk-free rate.  The concept of risk-neutral valuation is 
familiar from the binomial option pricing model, and more on this option pricing method can 
be found in Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979), McDonald (2006) and Hull (2006).   
A description of stock price behaviour 
In the previous section we saw that the very essence of a Monte Carlo valuation is to be able 
to simulate scenarios for how the stock price will evolve in the future.  Hence it is crucial to 
understand how the stock price can be modelled.  While the Monte Carlo valuation of a 
structured product is a central part of this thesis, the main aim is to analyse and discuss 
whether the bank has taken advantage of its superior informational position in the sale and 
marketing of structured products.  Hence, a thorough explanation of how stock prices are 
modelled in financial mathematics is outside the scope of this paper.  However, since the 
Monte Carlo method assumes that the stock price can be modelled as a stochastic process, I 
will briefly explain why this is the case, before we return to the description of the Monte 
Carlo method for option pricing.    
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In reality, stocks are traded when the relevant stock exchange is open and the stock price is 
only recorded when an actual trade has been completed; stocks are traded in discrete time.  
Furthermore, many stock exchanges require that the trading is conducted according to 
certain intervals, for instance in steps of 10 cents.  These factors imply that the stock price is 
a discrete variable, however when stock prices are modelled in the financial literature we 
assume that the stock price is a continuous variable.  It is also normal to assume that stock 
prices follow a random walk, a thought that was first formulated by Samuelson (1965).  The 
random walk theory proclaims that stock prices should reflect all available information in 
efficient markets, and the price is thus equally likely to move up or down in response to new 
information
20
 (McDonald, 2006).  Since we assume that stocks move up or down in a 
random, unsystematic manner we can model the stock price as a stochastic process (Bøe, 
2007). A stochastic process is a random process that is a function of time (McDonald, 2006).   
In the Monte Carlo simulation, I assume that the stock price follows an Itô process known as 
geometric Brownian motion.  In essence, it means that instead of assuming that stocks move 
up and down completely at random, we include a positive drift term in the process, 
accounting for the fact that we expect that stocks will increase in value over time. The 
process is described in equation Equation 4-7: 
 
Equation 4-7 
To see an explanation for how the process in Equation 4-7 is derived, see for instance Loven 
and Garås (2008).  For more information on stochastic processes, see for example Cox and 
Miller (1965), Hull (2006) or McDonald (2006)  
4.2.1 The Monte  Carlo method 
In this section we will see how the protected equity notes Global and Sektor can be evaluated 
using the Monte Carlo method.  Both these notes are contingent on a portfolio of three stock 
indices.  The first step is thus to estimate the correlation of returns for the three indices.  Let 
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ρxy denote the coefficient of correlation between index x and y.  The correlation between the 
three sub indices can be presented by the matrix sigma: 
 
Equation 4-8 
When we have estimated the correlation matrix we can simulate price paths for the three 
underlying indices.  If the indices were uncorrelated we could simply simulate three 
uncorrelated paths, but to simulate price paths for correlated assets we need to use Cholesky 
decomposition, which is the decomposition of a symmetric, positive-definite matrix into the 
product of a lower triangular matrix and its conjugate transpose (Bøe, 2007).  That is, we 
need to find 
 
Equation 4-9 
so that when  is multiplied with its transpose  the resulting matrix is the same as  (Bøe, 
2007): 
 
Equation 4-10 
This equation is solved by writing a function in Excel using Visual Basic for Applications 
(VBA).  This macro can be found in Appendix 2. 
For each time tk we want to simulate we need to generate 3 random numbers (one for each 
index) and transform them to standard normally distributed variables Zi(tk).  These random 
variables then need to be adjusted for the correlation between the price paths of the three 
indices (Loven & Garås, 2008).  Using the matrix found in the Cholesky decomposition, the 
correlated random standard normally distributed variables zi(tk) can be found from 
(Koekebakker & Zakamouline, 2006): 
 
Equation 4-11 
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The variables zi(tk) are used in the MC simulation of the price paths for the three indices, 
which we saw earlier follows the stochastic process: 
 
Equation 4-12 
Given the price paths for the three sub indices, we can calculate the return on the option for 
each trial in the Monte Carlo simulation.  The return on the option equals (Koekebakker & 
Zakamouline, 2006): 
 
Equation 4-13 
Where wi represents the weights for each sub index,  is the arithmetic average of prices 
at the beginning of the life of the product (Strike): 
 
Equation 4-14 
And   is the arithmetic average of prices at expiration 
 
Equation 4-15 
Equiations 4-11 to 4-15 are repeated up to the required number of trials by running the 
macro CalculateOption(), which was written in VBA and can be found in Appendix 2.  
We can now calculate the expected return and standard deviation for the Monte Carlo 
simulation.  The expected return is the average of the expected returns for the simulation 
estimates.  The standard deviation for each simulation equals (Loven & Garås, 2008): 
 
Equation 4-16 
Where  is the price estimates for price path k. 
The standard deviation for the total simulation is 
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Equation 4-17 
And the 95% confidence interval for the simulation is 
 
Equation 4-18 
4.2.2 Improving the efficiency of Monte Carlo methods 
The procedure above is described as a „naïve‟ Monte Carlo, since no attempt has been made 
to reduce the variance of the simulated answer for a given number of trials.  While I adhere 
to the standard Monte Carlo technique in my simulations, McDonald (2006) discusses two 
main methods to achieve faster, more accurate MC valuations: 
The control variate method 
The idea of the control variate method is to estimate the error on each trial by using the price 
of a related option that does have a pricing formula.  The variance reduction from the control 
variate method can be dramatic but in our case difficult to employ.  The option components 
of Global and Sektor are quite complicated; with three underlying indices and averaging of 
both starting and maturity price.  While the results from DnB and Johnsen could have served 
as control variates, the aim in this case is to test the results from these analyses, which means 
that this is not an appropriate solution.  Also, the results achieved without employing the 
control variate method will be accurate enough for the purpose of discussing information 
asymmetries in the market for these products.  
The antithetic method 
This method uses the insight that for every simulated realization there is an opposite and 
equally likely realization; if we draw a random variable 0.5 we could just as well have drawn 
-0.5.  When we use the opposite of each normal draw we get two simulated outcomes for 
each random path drawn.  However, drawing a random number is often not the time-
consuming part of a Monte Carlo valuation; the efficiency gain is achieved because the two 
estimates are negatively related, and adding them reduced the variance of the estimate.  
Boyle et al. (1997) find modest benefits from using the antithetic variate method.  
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For more information on variance reduction methods for Monte Carlo simulations see for 
instance Boyle, Broadie and Glasserman (1997); Joy, Boyle and Tan (1996) and Fouque and 
Han (2004). 
4.3 Expected return on DnB Global and DnB Sektor 2000-
2006 
In this section I will use the Monte Carlo method to estimate the expected return on Global 
and Sektor based on the parameters chosen by Johnsen and DnB NOR Markets respectively.  
Johnsen (2008) note that his model more than likely overvalue the expected return on the 
products due to the assumption of additive lognormality, and he further argue that this is also 
the case with the model used by the bank.  This assumption occurs because a simplified 
model treats the underlying portfolio as one asset, as opposed to three correlated sub-indices.  
Herein lies also the most important problem faced in my simulations; since the simplified 
models treat the underlying as one asset it is only necessary to make assumptions on 
variables such as the risk premium and volatility on the portfolio as a whole, instead of 
finding three sets of variables for the different sub indices.  However, we can derive 
estimations of expectations on the risk premium, volatility and correlations of returns on the 
three sub indices from the overall assumptions made on the composite portfolio, and I will 
explain how this can be done in the next section
21
.   
4.3.1 Input parameters 
Because we estimate the price paths for the underlying indices using the natural logarithm e, 
we need to convert annualised interest rates to continuously compounded returns before we 
can use them as inputs in the simulation.  Continuously compounded returns can be 
calculated from annualised rates using the conversion formula (McDonald, 2006): 
 
Equation 4-19 
The assumptions made by Johnsen and DnB NOR respectively with respect to dividend 
yields, risk premiums and volatility are made on the total of the underlying portfolio.  We 
                                                 
21 While the aim of these simulations is to make estimations based on the parameters assumed by DnB NOR and Johnsen 
respectively, it is always a risk that the derived numbers to not exactly match the authors‟ original intentions.   
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therefore need to investigate what these assumptions would mean for the development in the 
sub-indices separately.   
Risk free rates 
While Koekebakker and Zakamouline employs yields on 6-year governmental bonds, DnB 
NOR and Johnsen use swap rates, which are slightly higher than the bond yields thanks to a 
small credit risk premium (approximately 0.5%).  I have altered the individual country rates 
from Koekebakker and Zakamouline (2006) to reflect this credit premium.  
Dividend yields 
DnB NOR argue that the previous 12-month dividend yields for the indices should be used 
in the price estimates.  The bank found that the weighted average yield for Global was 
0.96%, which is approximately equal to my own estimates.  The individual index 12-month 
yields are 0.90% for EuroSTOXX50 (STOXX Limited, 2009), 1.14% for the S&P500 
(Damodaran, 2009), and 0.88% for the Nikkei225 (TSE Group, Inc., 2009).  When it comes 
to the sub indices included in the Sektor portfolio, finding individual index dividend yields 
proved difficult, and I will therefore apply the 1.97% dividend yield estimate to each of the 
three sub indices.   
Johnsen chose to base his estimates on normal historical levels for expected dividend yields, 
and I will thus apply the 1.50% yield universally to the Global indices and 2.0% for the 
Sektor indices.   
Index volatility and correlation 
According to DnB NOR, the implicit volatility of the Global and Sektor portfolios were 
23.6% and 28.6% respectively.  As the products were designed and purchased in times of 
increasing volatility, it is not abnormal that the implicit volatilities of the products were 
higher than historical volatility at the time, however from the graphs presented in Appendix 
1 we see that these estimates are fairly high in terms of historical volatility, which implies 
that the premium charged on the call options purchased by DnB must have included a 
generous profit for the relevant investment bank (Johnsen, 2008).  Also, section 8.1.2 shows 
that the correlations between the sub indices of Global in particular were relatively low, 
providing a significant diversification effect on the volatility of the overall portfolios.  In 
order to apply the bank‟s volatilities to the Monte Carlo simulation, we need to estimate the 
approximate volatility for each sub index.  Standard portfolio tells us that the volatility of a 
portfolio of asset is given by 
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Equation 4-20 
Where  is the weight of asset i,  is the volatility and  is the coefficient of correlation 
between assets i and j (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2005).  Thus, in order for the overall 
volatility to increase, either the volatility of the sub indices or the correlation between them 
must increase (diminishing the diversification effect), or both.  In Appendix 3 I show how 
the volatility of the portfolios Global and Sektor change when the volatility of the sub 
indices increase holding correlation constant, and vice versa.  It is Johnsen‟s correlation 
estimates that determine the initial levels of index correlation. It becomes apparent here that 
the volatility and or correlation must increase significantly in order for the volatility of the 
overall portfolio to increase to 23.6%.  Obviously, estimating how the bank could have 
perceived increased portfolio volatility to have been shared between increased sub-index 
volatility and increased correlation involves some guesswork, but such approximations will 
suffice for the purpose of this analysis as long as the relationship between volatility and 
expected risk premium for individual indices and overall portfolio is maintained.  Because 
the bank derives its expected risk premium from the volatility numbers, it is possible to 
approximate the volatility levels for the indices from the stated expected risk premium.  
Using this method I estimate that volatilities for EuroSTOXX50, S&P 500 and Nikkei225 
increase approximately 55% to 29.45%, 25.89% and 34.6% respectively, which implies that 
the correlations increase with 50%
22
 in order to satisfy Equation 4-20.  The volatility and 
correlation levels chosen for Sektor is summarised in Table 7. 
I have also decomposed the volatility levels for Global and Sektor chosen by Johnsen, and 
the estimations are also presented in Table 7.  The correlation are here expected to increase 
by approximately 40% and 20% percent for the Global and Sektor indices respectively, 
which entails that we increase volatility with 20% for all indices.   
                                                 
22 It is clearly a simplifying assumption to deduce that the all the relevant correlations within each portfolio increase by the 
same percentage, and likewise with respect to the individual index volatility levels.  The alternative would be to make 
expectations on future volatility for each individual index and the correlation between the three, but this requires extensive 
knowledge regarding the bank‟s (or Johnsen‟s) predictions on the development within these sub-indices.  The assumptions 
made above clearly illustrates that we would need to see a significant change in underlying volatility and correlations in 
order to satisfy DnB‟s expected volatility of 23.6% and 28.6% respectively, and are sufficient for the purpose of testing the 
two products.  
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Risk premium 
The size of the risk premium and expected return on the underlying indices has a substantial 
direct effect on the expected option return, see for instance Equation 4-12.  The three 
analyses employ very different risk premiums, which explain a significant amount of the 
difference in results obtained (Johnsen, 2008, p. 11).  Furthermore, the risk premiums also 
differ by definition and compounding frequency; while both Koekebakker and Zakamouline 
and Johnsen employ annualised geometric averages, DnB NOR use continuously 
compounded arithmetic average returns in their calculations.   
Equation 2-4 shows the algebraic expression for the arithmetic average, which is simply the 
sum of a list of numbers divided on the count of that list of numbers.  When it comes to 
investment returns, it only represents the average return achieved in each year of the 
investment period.  The geometric average (Equation 2-5), on the other hand, represents the 
constant rate of return needed in each year to match actual performance over some past 
investment period (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2005).  The geometric average is as such the 
superior measure of past performance, and according to Johnsen (2008) it is the geometric 
risk premium that will be determining the expected option return when the stock price 
follows a lognormal stochastic process.  However, since the geometric return will always be 
lower than the arithmetic mean, “it constitutes a downward-biased estimator of the stock‟s 
expected return in any future year” (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2005, p. 865), and many will as 
such argue that the arithmetic average return is a better measure with respect to estimating 
future performance
23
.  In order to address this potential for both upward and downward bias 
in the estimate of expected return, I have conducted two sets of simulations for the products; 
one using arithmetic average risk premiums and the other employing geometric risk 
premiums.  Conversion between geometric and arithmetic averages can be done through 
Equation 4-21:  
 
Equation 4-21 
Since DnB NOR derive the risk premiums from their volatility expectations by assuming a 
0.25 constant Sharpe-ratio for the underlying portfolio, we can use the same assumption 
                                                 
23 And since compounding at the estimated arithmetic mean results in an upward bias of future performance, this might not 
necessarily be such a great measure either (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2005). 
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when finding the expected risk premium for the individual indices
24
.  The risk premiums 
chosen by Johnsen are employed universally to the sub indices of the Global and Sektor 
portfolios.  The risk premiums for Johnsen and DnB NOR as well as all other parameters 
employed in the simulation are summarised and compared to Koekebakker and Zakamouline 
in Table 7.  All rates are continuously compounded. 
Table 7: Summary of parameters 
                                                 
24 In order to maintain the relationship between overall volatility/risk premium and the risk premium/volatility/correlations 
of the sub indices, I have decreased the Sharpe ratio for the sub indices to 0.22 for Global and 0.225 for Sektor, since the 
chosen volatility level yielded too high risk premiums as compared to the weighted average stated by DnB NOR.  The other 
alternative, keeping the Sharpe ratio constant while decreasing volatility and increasing correlation would have implied 
increased correlation levels of more than 150%, which in this context seem implausible.    
25 Geometric risk premium for overall portfolio. 
 DnB Global 2000/2006  DnB Sektor 2000/2006 
 
Euro 
STOXX50 S&P500 
Nikkei 
225 
 STOXX 
Health 
STOXX 
Telecom 
STOXX 
Bank 
DnB NOR 
       
- Risk free rate 5.49% 6.32% 1.26%  5.30% 5.30% 5.30% 
- Dividend yield 0.90% 1.13% 0.88%  1.94% 1.94% 1.94% 
- Geometric risk premium25 3.39% 3.39% 3.39%  3.43% 3.43% 3.43% 
- Arithmetic risk premium 6.48% 5.69% 7.61%  6.11% 8.56% 6.73% 
- Volatility 29.45% 25.89% 34.60%  27.14% 38.05% 29.90% 
- Correlation 
- EuroSTOXX 
- S&P500 
- Nikkei225 
 
1.000 
0.585 
0.420 
 
0.585 
1.000 
0.090 
 
0.420 
0.090 
1.000 
  
1.000 
0.624 
0.780 
 
0.624 
1.000 
0.780 
 
0.780 
0.780 
1.000 
Johnsen 
       
- Risk free rate 5.49% 6.32% 1.26%  5.30% 5.30% 5.30% 
- Dividend yield 1.49% 1.49% 1.49%  1.98% 1.98% 1.98% 
- Geometric risk premium 2.96% 2.96% 2.96%  2.66% 2.66% 2.66% 
- Arithmetic risk premium 4.70% 4.70% 4.70%  5.20% 5.20% 5.20% 
- Volatility 22.67% 19.93% 26.63%  21.42% 29.99% 23.56% 
- Correlation 
- EuroSTOXX 
- S&P500 
- Nikkei225 
 
1.000 
0.546 
0.392 
 
0.546 
1.000 
0.084 
 
0.392 
0.084 
1.000 
  
1.000 
0.576 
0.720 
 
0.576 
1.000 
0.720 
 
0.720 
0.720 
1.000 
Koekebakker and Zakamouline 
     
- Risk free rate 5.21% 6.00% 1.19%  5.21% 5.21% 5.21% 
- Dividend yield 2.07% 1.70% 0.80%  1.42% 1.93% 2.80% 
- Geometric risk premium 5.30% 5.80% 6.70%  4.23% 5.78% 5.56% 
- Volatility 19.16% 16.26% 20.36%  19.97% 22.36% 20.36% 
- Correlation 
- EuroSTOXX 
- S&P500 
- Nikkei225 
 
1.0000 
0.6689 
0.4017 
 
0.6689 
1.0000 
0.5092 
 
0.4017 
0.5092 
1.0000 
  
1.0000 
0.5048 
0.6342 
 
0.5048 
1.0000 
0.6204 
 
0.6342 
0.6204 
1.0000 
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4.3.2 Results 
The law of large numbers (LLN) will ensure that as the number of simulations increase, the 
estimate for expected option return will converge towards its true value (Glasserman, 2003).  
In order to provide an accurate estimation of the expected return on the different products, I 
have run the Monte Carlo simulations for arithmetic risk premiums with 1,000,000 
iterations.  When testing the results using geometric expected risk premiums, I completed 
100,000 trials.  The results from each product/parameter simulation are provided in 
Appendix 4: Simulation results.  These tables show the expected return on the option, the 
standard deviation of the total simulation, and expected total return at 4.5% transaction fees 
for both equity and debt financing.  Table 8 below provides a summary of the results and 
probability distributions for each simulation. 
 
Table 8: Summary of results from simulations for DnB Global and Sektor 
E(Rc) denotes expected call option return.  The table also shows probability of negative return, probability of 
return below the relevant risk free rate (6.77% p.a. for Johnsen and DnB NOR Markets), and the probability of 
experiencing maximum losses, i.e. the option expires worthless. 
Limitations 
The most significant limitations of the above analysis is that I had to make assumptions on 
the volatility levels, correlation and expected return on the underlying indices, since both 
0.50% 4.50% 0.50% 4.50% 0.50% 4.50% 0.50% 4.50% 0.50% 4.50%
E(Rc) Global - -
E(Rc) Sektor - -
Equity financed
E(R) GLOBAL 62.39% 56.10% 70.35% 63.83% 57.79% 51.75% 53.60% 47.72% 47.79% 42.13%
Per annum 8.42% 7.70% 9.28% 8.58% 7.90% 7.20% 7.42% 6.72% 6.73% 6.03%
Probability R<0 14.16% 16.54% 28.83% 31.22% 34.15% 36.69% 24.30% 27.18% 27.38% 30.48%
Probability R<r 46.35% 50.22% 55.07% 57.73% 61.16% 63.74% 58.34% 61.82% 62.43% 65.80%
Probability max loss 13.80% 13.80% 28.54% 28.54% 33.81% 33.81% 23.93% 23.93% 27.00% 27.00%
E(R) SEKTOR 57.80% 51.40% 79.47% 72.60% 54.15% 48.25% 58.92% 52.84% 46.62% 41.01%
Per annum 7.90% 7.16% 10.24% 9.52% 7.48% 6.78% 8.03% 7.33% 6.59% 5.90%
Probability R<0 22.10% 24.90% 30.19% 32.40% 41.26% 43.73% 32.28% 32.28% 35.25% 38.32%
Probability R<r 53.50% 57.10% 54.13% 56.56% 65.73% 67.92% 57.31% 60.44% 66.59% 69.44%
Probability max loss 21.70% 21.70% 29.90% 29.90% 40.94% 40.94% 26.10% 26.10% 34.90% 34.90%
Debt financed
E(R) GLOBAL -3.14% -9.24% 7.15% 0.62% -5.47% -12.00% -9.68% -16.21% -15.53% -22.06%
Per annum -0.53% -1.60% 1.16% 0.10% -0.93% -2.11% -1.68% -2.90% -2.77% -4.07%
Probability R<0 60.89% 66.10% 60.38% 62.96% 66.30% 68.85% 65.18% 68.47% 69.06% 72.16%
Probability R<r - - 76.43% 78.01% 81.11% 82.47% 84.01% 85.64% 86.56% 88.04%
Probability max loss 13.80% 13.80% 28.54% 28.54% 33.81% 33.81% 23.93% 23.93% 27.00% 27.00%
E(R) SEKTOR -8.30% -14.00% 16.32% 9.79% -9.14% -15.67% -4.34% -10.87% -16.70% -23.23%
Per annum -1.43% -2.48% 2.55% 1.57% -1.58% -2.80% -0.74% -1.90% -3.00% -4.31%
Probability R<0 65.90% 68.90% 58.95% 61.33% 70.06% 72.14% 63.50% 66.45% 72.23% 74.82%
Probability R<r - - 73.79% 75.32% 82.58% 83.73% 81.13% 82.77% 87.04% 88.28%
Probability max loss 21.70% 21.70% 29.90% 29.90% 40.94% 40.94% 26.10% 26.10% 34.90% 34.90%
Summary results
55.79% 46.22%
54.92% 45.10%59.72%
67.81%
80.37%
Geometric RP Geometric RP
DnB
Arithmetic RP Arithmetic RP
Johnsen
51.78%
KZ
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DnB NOR and Johnsen makes assumptions for the overall portfolios only.  However, the 
parameters that were chosen corresponds with the portfolio parameters chosen by the before-
mentioned studies, which implies that the overall results would not have been significantly 
altered if I had made slightly different assumptions.  Also, I have adhered to standard Monte 
Carlo simulation and have as such not implemented a variance reducing technique.  
Nevertheless, the results that are provided in Appendix 4 shows that the standard deviation 
of the simulations were quite small, and the 95% confidence intervals for the expected 
returns are as such very narrow.    
4.4 Discussion 
Let us first note that when applying geometric risk premiums in the simulations, the 
expected returns for both products with either Johnsen or DnB‟s parameters are negative 
when the investments are debt financed.  The probability that the investor will have a 
negative return is between 66-75%, dependent on the fee level and product/parameters 
combination.  The call option embedded in the product will expire valueless with a 
probability of between 27% and 41%.  The Monte Carlo simulation provides consistently 
lower results than the simplified model employed by Johnsen.  The return for DnB NOR‟s 
parameters was 7.20% and 6.78% per annum for Global and Sektor respectively, as 
compared to 9.29% and 9.47% from Johnsen‟s model.  Johnsen estimates the respective 
returns to be 7.07% and 7.12%, whereas the simulations provide returns of 6.03% for Global 
and 5.90% for Sektor.  These results confirm Johnsen‟s predictions that his simplified model 
overvalues the products due to the assumption of additive lognormality.  The probability 
distribution for the DnB NOR simulation is found in Figure 11 and for Johnsen in 12. 
 
Figure 11: Probability distributions for Global and Sektor with DnB NOR's parameters and 
geometric RP 
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It is also worth noting that the high volatility levels assumed by DnB NOR cause the 
corresponding geometric risk premiums to be lower than those chosen by Koekebakker and 
Zakamouline.  The resulting expected returns from the simulation with the bank‟s 
parameters are also consistently smaller than in Koekebakker and Zakamouline‟s analysis.  
Although the high volatility level is “punishing” expected geometric return, it is also clearly 
contributing to the value of the product; a high standard deviation of the underlying portfolio 
cause the simulation to return many extreme observations in both tails of the distribution.  
However, since the option payoff is either positive or zero (Equation 2-3), only the positive 
extremes will significantly impact the average return on the option.  For instance, the 
maximum option return achieved in the DnB NOR Sektor (geometric) simulation was 
1596.22%, which implies an annual return of just over 59% (equity financed, 4.5% 
transaction fee).  An equivalent negative draw would return 0%, and the positive draw will 
as such have a greater impact on the average option return.  
Both the two products thus had negative expected returns from debt financing under the 
assumption of geometric risk premiums, but what were the results from the arithmetic 
simulations?  Applying arithmetic risk premiums gives consistently lower estimates than 
Johnsen for Global, while the opposite is true for Sektor.  The higher volatility levels 
assumed for Sektor has a much more positive impact on the product value than in the case of 
geometric risk premiums, since the arithmetic average return does not punish volatility.  
However, the estimates for Sektor are only slightly higher than those predicted by Johnsen, 
and are lower than the results from DnB NOR‟s model (which employs arithmetic risk 
premiums).  The arithmetic simulations give the bank the benefit of high risk premiums, 
high volatility levels and high correlation (and as such no diversification effect reducing the 
volatility of the underlying portfolio); all which are factors that will positively influence the 
Figure 12: Probability distributions for Global and Sektor with Johnsen’s parameters and 
geometric RP 
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bank‟s estimate.  Still, the expected return from a debt financed Global investment at 4.5% 
transaction fee is only 0.10% per annum, and the investor will lose money in nearly 2 out of 
3 scenarios.  The probability distributions with arithmetic risk premiums are shown in 
Figures 13 and 14.   
In sum, the results from these simulations give grounds to doubt the bank‟s argument that 
debt financing could have been profitable for the customers.  My analysis supports the 
conclusions from Koekebakker/Zakamouline and Johnsen, and also confirms Johnsen‟s 
predictions that the actual annual expected loss on the products are in the range of 3-5%
26
.  
                                                 
26 While Johnsen‟s model predict losses of 1-2.3% per annum, he estimate that the annual expected loss is actually 3-5% 
Figure 13: Probability distribution for Global and Sektor with DnB NOR's parameters and 
arithmetic RP 
Figure 14: Probability distribution for Global and Sektor with Johnsen's parameters and 
arithmetic RP 
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4.5 Structured products as investment strategy: a note on 
debt financing 
Why have structured products turned out to be such bad investment strategies for the average 
non-professional investor?  Under certain conditions it is very rational for an investor to 
reduce his risk of loss by adding a derivative component to his portfolio, however it appears 
many of the products marketed in Norway were very costly; according to Kleven (2008, p. 
2) “caused by the greed of some distributors”.  More that 80 per cent of Norwegians have 
debt finance their investment in these products., and many experts (Bjerksund, Carlsen, & 
Stensland, 1999; Lindset, 2008; Johnsen, 2008; Solvær, Steinnes, & Stølen, 2006) have 
argued that such debt financing is particularly inappropriate for non-professional investors, 
which was confirmed by Kredittilsynet with the introduction of Circular 4/2008 in March 
last year.  Let us briefly analyse why this is the case.  
When an investor uses debt financing to finance 100% of the investment in the structured 
product, he in effect borrows money from the bank only to lend them back at a lower interest 
rate.  In the case of DnB Global and Sektor, we have seen how the investor has borrowed to 
8.51% p.a.
27
 and received 6.77% p.a. on the capital protection component (zero-coupon 
bond) of the investment.  Assume an investor borrows 104.5 to cover both the invested 
amount and the transaction costs.  The bank will put 67.5 towards a zero-coupon bond, and 
4.5 will cover the initial, visible transaction costs (see Figure 15).  Johnsen (2008) estimates 
that the theoretical option premium including margin to the option seller is 26.8 for Global, 
which implies that the distributor, DnB NOR, received an extra margin of 5.7.  I have 
created a diagram that shows how the borrowed amount can be divided into three different 
cash flows; one for the guaranteed component, one for the option, and one for the bank‟s 
“service fees”.  Notice that since the bank is charging a higher interest on the loan than what 
the investor is receiving from the bond, the guaranteed component will always have a 
negative contribution to the total payoff and thus expected return of the product.  No matter 
what happens, the “guaranteed” component is a losing project, and the structured strategy 
would have a higher expected return if this guaranteed loss component was left out of the 
composite product and the investor invested in the option component directly.  However, 
debt financing an option purchase can be described as a risky project at best; it involves 
                                                 
27 Confirmed by DnB NOR in personal correspondence with Johnsen (2008) 
 61 
gearing an already leveraged investment, and is both extremely risky and highly speculative.  
A 100% debt financed investment in DnB Global
28
 can thus be characterised as a 
speculative, risky bet on the development in the EuroSTOXX, S&P and Nikkei indices 
coupled with a guaranteed loss component.  This description certainly does not live up to the 
guaranteed product described in DnB‟s prospectus and it is doubtful whether such an 
exposition would have attracted many non-professional investors which would generally be 
seeking capital protection and other low-risk strategies.         
 
                                                 
28 The argument also applies to Sektor. 
Borrow 104.5  
@ 8.51% p.a. 
Invest in bond 
 @ 6.77%: 
100/(1+0.0677)
6
 
67.5 
Invest in option: 
Johnsen‟s 
premium estimate 
26.8 
Pay fees: 
100*0.045 = 4.5 
+100–(67.5+26.8) 
10.2 
Receive 
 @ 6.77%: 
67.5*(1+0.0677)
6
 
100 
Receive 
Max(ST-K, 0): 
?? 
Pay @ 8.51%: 
67.5*(1+0.085)
6 
110 
Pay @ 8.51%: 
26.8*(1+0.085)
6 
43.5 
Pay @ 8.51%: 
10.2*(1+0.085)
6 
16.5 
Payoff:  
= - 10 
Payoff:  
= - 43.5 + ?? 
Payoff:  
= - 16.5 
Figure 15: DnB Global as investment strategy 
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5. Analysing the Norwegian structured product 
market 
In the previous chapters we have seen how structured products are created as well as how 
they can be valued, and we have applied this knowledge to a real world case.  Using the 
Monte Carlo valuation technique we confirmed the results from previous analyses that the 
much debated products DnB Global and Sektor 2000/2006 have a negative expected return 
when the investments are debt financed.  More than 80 per cent of investments in structured 
products have been financed by personal bank loans (SSB, 2009b), and Norwegian 
customers have lost approximately 14 billion kroner on these investments, according to 
estimations by Dine Penger (Stranden, 2009).  The analysis in chapter 4 indicates that 
products of sub-standard quality have been distributed, and this gives rise to two important 
questions: why did the distributors sell such products? And why did customers buy them? In 
order to provide answers to these questions, we need to understand the underlying incentives 
that have driven behaviour on both the buyer and seller sides of the market for structured 
products.  It is when we understand why this market existed in the first place that we also 
can address the question of whether the banks (and other suppliers) have taken advantage of 
information asymmetry in the sale of structured products.  
5.1 The sellers and their incentives 
While banks through their roles as intermediaries between lenders/savers and borrowers are 
important to the workings of the financial system and society in general, this does not 
suppress the fact that the primary goal of a banks‟ operations is to increase shareholder value 
by turning a profit
29
.  Hence, the central question with respect to what incentives the banks 
had to sell structured products is whether these products were profitable.  It is important to 
acknowledge that most banks have been extremely reluctant to release information to the 
public that could refute, or confirm, the massive criticism that has been directed towards the 
sale of (debt financed) structured products.  Information such as cost structure, yearly profits 
and hedging expenses remain well protected business secrets.  We can only speculate 
                                                 
29 Although with the appearance of so-called ethical (social, alternative, civic, or sustainable) banks we have seen that not 
all banks adhere to this conventional goal, Cultura Bank in Norway is one example.  
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whether this is in order to avoid strategic information becoming available to competitors, or 
if such documentation would only trigger more criticism (Gjerde K. V., 2006a).  It was in 
order to address some aspects of this obvious information gap that Kredittilsynet conducted 
their survey at the end of 2007.  This report is the most comprehensive and credible source 
of information with respect to analysing supplier incentives and behaviour in the market for 
structured products, however it is important to keep in mind that it is based on self-
disclosure and it is as such not completely impartial.  Kredittilsynet (2008) could further 
report that the quality differences in the responses the banks gave in relation to income from 
structured products was substantial, however some useful information can still be found in 
this survey. 
Firstly, DnB NOR reported that the income from structured products would normally 
approximate 2.5% of pre-tax profits.  While this income might not be typical for other banks 
that have sold these products, it does give us an indication of the profit levels involved.  The 
2007 pre-tax profits for DnB NOR amounted to 15.4 billion NOK, which implies that the 
income from structured products according to Kredittilsynets‟ report would be in vicinity of 
385 million NOK for 2007 (DnB NOR, 2008).  Secondly, while the total income from these 
products did not necessarily account for a very large part of the banks‟ profits, more than 50 
per cent of the banks stated that some of the income from the products were not directly 
related to the stated transaction fees and interest, but sprung from different product features 
such as product margin and structure margin; margins that for a long time customers were 
completely unaware of.  The fact that these products posit possibilities for hiding fees have 
been thoroughly documented in the literature, and I have summarised the most relevant 
results in Table 9
30
.   
Thirdly, debt financing in relation to structured products has as we have seen been an 
extremely profitable combination for the banks.  The interest spread for the customers in 
relation to the products Global and Sektor was for instance 1.74%.  A margin of 1.74% when 
the default risk is limited to interest payments only is clearly a lucrative deal for the bank.  
 
                                                 
30 The table only present results from a range of different analyses conducted on the actual value of these products.  I have 
not evaluated the methods used to achieve the estimated price.  The table assumes the issuing price of each product is 100. 
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Study Product Estimated 
value 
Fossedal and Nagell (2000) DnB Teknologi/Farmasi 2000/2006 92.76 
Johnsen (2008) DnB Global 2000/2006 
DnB Sektor 2000/2006 
94.31 
94.25 
Knutsen and Jensen (1999) Kreditkassen Global 1999/2005 
Kreditkassen Global Risiko 1999/2005 
88.57 
84.65 
Krogh (2002) DnB Japan 1997/2002 
Nordea Europa 2002/2006 
Postbanken BMA ‟Best av‟ 2002/2007 
DnB BMA Global 2002/2005 
Orkla Finans Podium 25 
96.55 
99.60 
96.91 
98.10 
95.30 
Lie, Lindset and Lund (2005) Garantibonus III 96.40 
Haugo (2007)  DnB NOR Alternativ Energi III 2007/2009 
Nordea Trippel Aksjer 2007/2009 
DnB NOR Global Pluss 2007/2012 
99.39 
96.33 
92.21 
Husebø (2002) DnB Europa/USA 2002/2007 
DnB Japan II 2000-2003 
Sandnes Internasjonale Garanti 2001/2006 
92.90 
90.30 
92.14 
Loven and Garås (2008) Nordea Kraftobligasjon XIV 2007/2010 
Orkla Finans Kraft II 
Nordea Aksjeverden 2008/2012 
Handelsbanken Aksjeindeksobligasjon 3008A 
96.13 
91.49 
88.39 
94.20 
Solvær, Steinnes and Stølen (2005) DnB NOR Japan 2006/2009 
Handelsbanken Europa/Japan 2005/2010 (low)
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Handelsbanken Europa/Japan 2005/2010 (high) 
Fokus Bank USA/Japan 2004/2007 
96.86 
98.36 
96.81 
97.84 
Sture (2001) DnB Global Titans 2001/2006 91.25 
Wangen (2004) DnB NOR Faktor 150 
Nordea Global Pluss India 
Fokus Allegro 18 
98.87 
88.76 
97.03 
Table 9: Valuations of protected equity notes and market-linked CDs 
The fact that banks were earning money on these products is indisputable, even if it is 
difficult to estimate just how much they have earned.  The profit potential provides a strong 
argument for why a bank should choose to distribute these products, but what considerations 
might have weighed against the decision?  A negative public reaction stemming from banks 
providing sub-standard products holds the potential to damage the banks reputation and the 
possibility of losing customers.  However, it seems likely that the banks perceived the cost of 
damaged reputation too small to offset the expected income from the products.  We should 
also consider the possibility that the bankers responsible for creating and distributing these 
financial instruments did not expect the products to be exposed the way they have been 
                                                 
31 When buying the Handelsbanken product the investor could choose between a risk averse (low) or more risk seeking 
alternative (high).  
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thanks to the global financial crisis that began in July 2007.  In hindsight we have seen the 
products take a massive beating in Norwegian media and academia, which have caused a 
public relations disaster that the banks (and DnB NOR in particular) had not foreseen; and 
the costs of distributing sub-standard products have as such probably been a lot higher than 
the banks anticipated.   
The profit-argument indicated that the banks should choose to sell these products, but why 
did moral considerations not prevent the banks from distributing them?  Today, the 
connection between the bank and the customers is generally fairly transient, and not 
necessarily built on a long-term personal relationship.  It seems that the nature of this 
relationship has caused many bankers to also view their obligations towards these customers 
on a more casual level, making it easier to act on the basis of profits rather than in 
accordance with the customer‟s best interest.  An example of this is the choice of return 
factor in the Global and Sektor products.  According to Johnsen (2008) it is particularly the 
employment of price averages, exclusion of dividends and significant hidden costs that 
considerably retard the return potential of these two products.  These are design elements 
that the bank have actively decided to include when constructing the product.  Johnsen 
(2008) calculated that by excluding hidden costs alone (i.e. only charging the transaction 
fees stated in the prospectus), the banks could have offered return factors of around 150% 
(1.5) for both products
32
.  This would have significantly improved the customers‟ return 
prospects, even when the investments were debt financed.   
The case of structured products has also opened for an increased focus on the conflict of 
interest faced by financial advisers employed by the bank.  Because the adviser has 
significantly more knowledge about investment products than the customer it is possible for 
him/her to give recommendation that promotes their own interests on the expense of the 
client‟s.  At the time when structured products first became popular there was no industry 
standard instigating how to appropriately deal with this conflict of interest, and the moral 
considerations were as such left up to the different institutions and the individual financial 
adviser.  While it is difficult to determine whether the banks had official employee codes of 
ethics or codes of conduct 10 to 12 years ago, we can ascertain that such measures were 
insufficient in guiding employees through the ethical dilemmas they faced on a daily basis.  
                                                 
32 Compared to the actual 105% for Global and 100% for Sektor. 
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Also, we also have reasons to believe that both individual institutions such as DnB NOR and 
the industry as a whole through the Norwegian Financial Services Association
33
 (FNH) has 
realised that the ethical rules and guidelines that have existed so far were inadequate.  DnB 
NOR informs for instance on their investor relations web site that a larger, company-wide 
program focusing on ethics was introduced in 2009 (DnB NOR, 2009).  Moreover, FNH and 
its member organisations have recently adapted an authorisation program for financial 
advisers (Autorisasjonsordningen for Finansielle Rådgivere), which has a strong focus on 
how ethical dilemmas can best be managed; the FNH has even developed a guide to ethics as 
part of the curriculum for the program (Kvalnes, 2009).  These recent measures is a strong 
signal that the banks and other financial institutions recognise that the focus on moral 
principles and beliefs have not been strong enough.  In the case of structured products it 
appears that we had a situation where profit margins took precedence over ethics.  
There is also another plausible explanation why financial advisers in particular did not 
question the morality of offering debt financing in relation to structured products:  If these 
advisers did not truly understand the characteristics of the products they were selling, and in 
fact had no better comprehension of the risks involved and return potential than the investor, 
then they might have actually believed that they were acting in the best interest of their 
customers.  Financial advisers have been strongly criticised for not having sufficient 
knowledge and understanding of structured products (Hegle, 2009; Gjerde K. V., 2006b).  
Kredittilsynet could report that the majority of banks have had internal training programs for 
their advisers in relation to structured products, which would culminate into a final exam or 
test.  Approximately 30 per cent of the banks did not have a test which was directly linked to 
these products.  Also, nearly 50 per cent of the banks experienced that advisers did not pass 
this exam; most banks would in this case suspend the person‟s right to sell the products until 
he or she re-sat and passed the exam; one bank would limit the amount of tests allowed to 
three before the candidate would be reassigned; and another stated that they imposed no 
consequences what so ever.  The industry now seems to be taking the problem of 
incompetent financial advisers more seriously, with the establishment of the authorisation 
system for financial advisers in Norway (Autorisasjonsordningen for Finasielle Rådgivere, 
                                                 
33 FNH represents banks, insurance companies, finance companies, management companies for securities funds, investment 
firms and financial conglomerates in Norway. 
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2009).  Also, regulatory authorities have signalled that they will enforce stricter and more 
frequent controls of the quality of financial advice in the future (Finansdepartementet, 2009). 
5.2 The buyers and their incentives 
In the previous section we discussed why the banks chose to sell products that were 
obviously not designed in the best interest of their customers, and in this section we will ask 
how they managed to get away with it for so long: Why did customers continue to buy these 
products?  Structured products were originally created for and introduced to the professional 
segment of the retail market, but is it really this group of investors that have been buying the 
products?  Almklov, Tørum, & Skjæveland (2006) found that approximately 90 per cent of 
the debt financed structured products was held by non-professional investors, and it is 
reasonable to assume that these investors are also behind a large majority of the outstanding 
investments in equity financed products.  Since professional investor participation has been 
low in the market (Sparre M. R., 2009a), and because their informational position relative to 
the bank is completely different to that of non-professional investors, I will here focus on the 
last group only.  
The banks have been very reluctant to share any information with respect to what types of 
customer buy structured products.  While there is no reliable information gathered on the 
specific demographics of the segment, we know from media reports that it is the Average Joe 
that has invested in this product.  Although we do not have specific information on the risk 
tolerance and preferences of investors in structured products, we do have such information 
on Norwegian non-professional investors in general.  According to a recent survey 
conducted by Forbrukerrådet, only 7% answer that they are willing to accept a larger amount 
of risk on their investments in order to achieve a return over the risk-free rate (see Figure 
166) (Forbrukerrådet, 2009a).  Two out of three Norwegians will accept small level of risk 
or no risk what so ever, which imply that the general non-professional investor is fairly risk-
averse.   
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Figure 16: Degree of risk tolerance non-professional investors (Forbrukerrådet, 
2009a, p. 8) 
This finding was not controversial compared to previous surveys; however Forbrukerrådet 
was surprised to find that the risk profile was quite similar when grouping the participants 
according to the actual investments they had conducted; see Figure 177.   
 
Figure 17: Accumulated risk acceptance over four product types (Forbrukerrådet, 
2009a, p. 8) 
It is quite a paradox that a remarkable 61% of investors that save in stock market funds, 
which are moderate to high risk products, have little or no acceptance of risk on their savings 
(Forbrukerrådet, 2009a).  It is clear that a large fraction of the non-professional investors do 
not understand the risk factors of a common product such as a managed stock fund.  The 
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survey further shows that nearly half of the investors placed their money in stock funds 
based on recommendations from an investment adviser at the bank or other financial 
institution, which implies that many advisers fail to ensure that the investor fully understands 
the risk factors of the investment (Forbrukerrådet, 2009a).  The survey also asked what time 
horizon the investors had with respect to the savings and the result here was very varied.  
Also, more than 50% of participants stated that it was important or very important for them 
to have access to the savings within the investment period.  In summary we can infer the 
following about the average non-professional, Norwegian investor: 
 He is very risk averse, and will only accept a small amount of risk on his 
investments; 
 He has a time horizon that reflects individual needs and aspirations; 
 He needs to be able to access at least parts of the investment in the investment 
period; 
 He has a limited understanding of the basic relationships of finance. 
 
5.2.1 Irrational preferences 
The marketing brochures for these products touted capital protection coupled with market 
exposure; that is, a potential for high returns with virtually no risk of losing money.  
Although it is relatively obvious why this is attractive to the non-professional investor, it can 
also be explained using Kahneman and Tversky‟s (1979) prospect theory.  While traditional 
finance use the variance as a risk measure and suggest that individuals weigh both positive 
and negative returns equally, prospect theory claims that individual risk preferences are not 
determined solely by deviations from the mean but depend significantly on gains and losses 
with respect to a certain reference point (Hens & Bachmann, 2008).  The concept most 
relevant to our discussion of structured product is the pseudo-certainty effect, which refers to 
people‟s contradictory attitudes towards risks involving gains and losses.  Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) found a systematic reversal of investor‟s preferences by variations in the 
framing of contingencies and/or outcomes, and showed that choices involving gains are 
often risk averse whereas choices involving losses are often risk taking.  While it involves a 
minor deviation from our present discussion, let us briefly look at one of the tests performed 
by the two psychologists, which clearly demonstrates the idea of this framing effect.   
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Presented with a scenario where the government was preparing for an outbreak of an unusual 
Asian disease expecting to kill 600 people, participants were asked to choose between two 
alternative programs to combat the disease.  If program A was adopted, 200 people would be 
saved, whereas if program B was adopted there was a 1/3 probability that 600 people would 
be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people would be saved.  In this scenario, 72% (28%) of 
participants preferred alternative A (B).  A second group of people were given the exact 
same scenario, but with a different formulation of the alternative programs: under treatment 
strategy C, 400 people would die, and in program D there was a 1/3 probability that nobody 
would die, and 2/3 probability that 600 would die.  The alternatives for the two scenarios are 
effectively identical, the only difference is that program A and B describe the outcome in 
terms of lives saved, whereas C and D describe the lives lost.  Surprisingly, this change is 
accompanied by a pronounced shift from risk aversion to risk taking, with 78% of 
participants preferring program C to program D.  Kahneman and Tversky (1991) further 
demonstrates that this risk aversion when evaluating gains is caused by people‟s tendency to 
strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains
34
; a behavioural bias referred to as loss 
aversion.  The banks have clearly played on this tendency of irrational preferences and 
framing effects in the construction, marketing and sale of structured products.  These 
products were first introduced to the Norwegian market at a time where a lot of investors had 
lost money by saving in stock market and other types of mutual funds.  In a time where the 
market was experiencing increased loss aversion, the main marketing point of these products 
was that the customer is guaranteed loss-avoidance; he is “guaranteed” to receive the 
invested capital at expiration.  The investments were as such packaged and sold by 
exploiting loss aversion, a well known form of irrationality.  The banks cleverly focused on 
the loss protection component, and evaded correctly informing customers about inherent 
risks, especially when it came to the use of debt financing.  Unfortunately, what customers 
realised far too late was that no such guarantee or loss protection exist once you debt finance 
these types of structured products (Ormseth, 2009).   
Irrational preferences provide one explanation for why structured products were so popular 
among non-professional investors.  The other significant factor that has played an important 
role is information asymmetry, specifically the impact of asymmetric information in a 
                                                 
34 In fact, some studies suggest that psychologically speaking, losses are twice as powerful as gains 
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situation based on trust and confidence.  This aspect is closely related to the well-known 
market for lemons problem, and we will discuss this issue next. 
5.2.2 Akerlof’s Market for Lemons 
The Market for Lemons problem was first presented in George Akerlof‟s seminal paper, and 
is a problem that can occur in any market where there are buyers and seller of products 
(Høgsand, 2008).  Akerlof (1970) argues that in markets where buyers use some market 
statistic to judge the quality of prospective purchases there are incentives for sellers to 
market poor quality merchandise as higher-quality ones.  While Akerlof developed his 
argument using the market for used cars as an example, the theory can just as well be applied 
to financial markets in general and structured products in particular.  The theory is very 
helpful in explaining why non-professional investors kept buying complex and unprofitable 
products. 
A situation of asymmetric information exists when one party to a transaction has more or 
better information than the other (Dixit & Skeath, 2004).  This lack of information or power 
imbalance creates problems on two fronts; adverse selection before the transaction is entered 
into and moral hazard
35
 after (Mishkin, 2007).  The way the adverse selection problem 
interferes with the efficient functioning of a market is called the “lemons problem”, referring 
to the problems caused by lemons in the used-cars market.  This problem implies that 
potential buyers are unable to assess whether a particular used car is a good car that will run 
well (a peach), or a lemon that will continually give them grief.  The buyer will thus only be 
willing to pay a price that reflects the average quality of the cars in the market (Mishkin, 
2007).  In contrast, the owner of the car is more likely to know whether the car is a peach or 
a lemon.  The owner of a lemon is more than happy to sell the car, since the average price 
the buyer is willing to pay is higher than the actual value of the lemon.  Conversely, owners 
of peaches know that their cars are undervalued at the price buyer is willing to pay, and may 
as such not want to sell it.  The result of this adverse selection is that few good used cars will 
come to the market (Akerlof, 1970; Mishkin, 2007).  
                                                 
35 Moral hazard refers to “the risk (hazard) that the borrower might engage in activities that are undesirable (immoral) from 
the lender‟s point of view, because they make it less likely that the loan will be repaid” (Mishkin, 2007, p. 38), and is as 
such not particularly relevant in this context.   
 72 
5.2.3 Are structured products lemons? 
We can see how the market for lemons problem might be an attractive explanation to the 
massive popularity and later down-fall of the structure products market.  According to 
Akerlof (1970), the following characteristics will produce a lemon‟s market: the presence of 
asymmetric information; the existence of incentives for sellers to pass of low quality 
products as higher quality products; the lack of credible disclosure technology on behalf of 
the sellers; a continuum of product qualities; and a deficiency of effective public quality 
assurances such as warranties and regulation.   
Distributors and sellers (financial advisers) of structured products have clearly had more and 
better information than the buyers, and the presence of asymmetric information is as such 
indisputable, although it appears that many investors have been unaware of its existence 
(Høgsand, 2008).  Let us consider low quality products to be products that contain large 
hidden margins/profits to the sellers and/or have a limited return potential (such as many 
debt-financed products).  If the distributors can pass of these products as higher quality 
products they will earn higher margins, which is a strong incentive endorsing such 
behaviour.  The prospectuses used to promote structured products have proven to be 
deficient at best, and the products themselves are complex and difficult for the potential 
buyer to evaluate.  Also, even people with sufficient expertise disagree on how to price the 
option component of structured products, and the banks have as such had no credible means 
to disclose the true quality of their products.  In previous discussions we have seen that the 
structured product market both comprise a vast range of product (and seller) qualities, and 
until early 2008 the regulatory presence was inadequate. 
Akerlof (1970) predicts that the presence of people in the market who are willing to offer 
inferior goods will tend to drive the market out of existence.  In the case of structured 
products, the massive criticism in media and the eventual regulatory action have caused the 
market to more or less evaporate; although we have seen that banks are trying to replicate the 
protected equity note/market-linked CD success with other structured innovations such as 
warrants.   Most banks have put a complete halt to the sale of structured products to non-
professional investors, and while it is good that this group of investors are now better 
protected against buying lemons, it also implies that they are more or less unable to buy 
peaches.  The costs associated with bad products is thus not only the amounts lost by cheated 
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customers, but also the losses incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence 
(Akerlof, 1970). 
The factors described above indicate that the structured product market somewhat resembles 
a market for lemons, or at least that the density of lemons is high.  However there is one 
aspect that differs greatly from a traditional lemons market, namely that the structured 
product market has experienced information asymmetries in two different dimensions: one is 
with respect to quality, and the other is due to the fact that customers were not aware of the 
fact that information asymmetry existed in the first place.  A pure market for lemons is just a 
big a problem for sellers as it is for buyers, but this is clearly not the case when it comes to 
structured products.  The main issue here is that most buyers did not consider information 
asymmetries and were completely unaware of the prospect that many products could very 
well be lemons; instead they trusted the advise and recommendation provided by the bank 
employees.  An important key for understanding the problems in this market is to recognise 
the market strength of the banks.  The Head of Securities Institutions Selection at 
Kredittilsynet Eystein Kleven commented in a presentation to the Structured Products 
Europe conference that one of the largest problems with respect to structured products are 
the circumstances in which these products have been sold (Kleven, 2008).  Products have 
been constructed in a complex and complicated manner, and it has been nearly impossible 
for common investors to properly evaluate the expected return and understand the risks 
involved.  This lack of transparency coupled with the fact that products “have been sold on 
the investor‟s confidence in the distributors as investment advisers” have given the 
distributors an immense and unique power (p. 1).  This power disparity has played out in the 
interactions with both customers and with the banks‟ own suppliers; because many producers 
compete for delivery of the products or option components to the distributor, the distributors 
have had incitements to choose the producer that will grant the largest rebate or discount on 
the option premium.   
The distributors held a strong position with respect to their own suppliers, but what has 
characterised the relationship with customers?  The sale of structured products has for the 
most part been conducted by so-called financial advisers stationed at the bank.  Customers 
have in meetings with these bank employees believed that they were receiving advice and 
sound recommendations, and in many cases failed to realise that they were subject to sales.  
Many investors had limited knowledge of financial markets and theory, and were as such 
completely reliant on the financial adviser; they both expected and trusted that any 
 74 
recommendations resulting from these meetings were inherently in their best interest.  A 
common analogy for the adviser/investor situation is the doctor/patient case.  The doctor has 
a medical education and is in a far superior informational position as compared to his patient.  
Yet the patient would expect that the diagnosis reached by the doctor is correct and based on 
the patient‟s symptoms, as opposed to whatever diagnosis provides the largest profit margin 
for the hospital.  Now, the doctor/patient context is of course heavily regulated, and it is as 
such a situation of “regulated trust”.  In the case of financial adviser and client it appears that 
when the supervisory body failed to regulate the relationship, the trust was completely 
misplaced.    
In summary we have a situation where two factors in particular explain why these products 
were so popular among non-professional investors.  Firstly, the irrationality of preferences 
which was actively used by the banks in marketing materials, design and sale of structured 
products.  Secondly, the misplaced trust in a situation of information asymmetry.  The last 
question I want to ask in this chapter is whether we have reasons to believe that the banks 
have consciously taken advantage of their superior informational position in the production 
and distribution of these products?  In order to answer this question we must first ask 
whether it is likely that the distributors realised that the average non-professional investors 
would not truly understand the products.  We have seen that structured products are 
relatively complex and very difficult to evaluate, and it is reasonable to assume that an 
investor must have a more than basic comprehension of financial theory and markets in order 
to accurately evaluate such products - and this notion must also have been obvious to DnB 
NOR and other distributors of structured products.  Furthermore, through their daily dealings 
with this particular investor group it should be expected that advisers/sellers can assess the 
financial knowledge and sophistication of their customers, in fact this expectation has been 
formalised through the adaption of the MiFID from November 2007 (Høgsand, 2008).  The 
answer to our question then is clearly yes, the banks must have realised that the average 
customer would not comprehend the likely consequences from debt financing structured 
products. 
When we consider this issue in conjunction with the fact that  
 the banks have been selling structured products with hidden margins/costs and in 
likely negative expected returns;  
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 that buyer behaviour has been driven by the desire for „low risk‟ and „stock market 
gains‟ – the notion that you can have your cake and eat it too, overcoming the 
conventional laws of finance; and  
 that the products have not been particularly popular among professional investors, 
more than likely because many of these realise that in an efficient market you cannot 
achieve high returns without carrying risk 
it is rational to conclude that the banks have in fact taken advantage of their superior 
informational position, and as such misused their customers‟ trust and confidence, in the sale 
of structured products.  
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6. Conclusions and final comments 
This paper has asked whether Norwegian banks have taken advantage of a superior 
informational position in the sale of structured products.  In chapters 2 and 3 I presented a 
framework for understanding the different components of structured products as well as the 
market for such products in Norway.  Two protected equity notes, DnB Global and Sektor 
2000/2006, were analysed in chapter 4, and I concluded that the expected negative return 
when fully debt financed was negative for both products.  The results from this analysis 
indicates that Norwegian banks have been selling sub-standard products, and in chapter 5 we 
asked why these products were marketed in the first place, and how they became so popular 
among non-professional investors.  The conclusion from our discussion is that Norwegian 
banks have taken advantage of information asymmetries when selling structured products, 
and have as such profited because customers did not fully understand the true value and the 
risk characteristics of these products.  A central question the Courts must decide is who is 
responsible for what happened in this market: the customers themselves; the 
sellers/distributors/producers; regulators; or a combination of these three?  It is possible to 
argue that the customers should and must carry at least some of the responsibility.  Claims 
that Norwegian non-professional investors are fairly naive and easily deceived when it 
comes to investments and financial decision making fuels a discussion of whether the only 
way for these investors to learn how to protect their finances is the hard way (Dn.no, 2009; 
Sparre M. R., 2009b).  However, the analysis from this paper suggests that banks through the 
use of financial advisers have a strong and irrevocable responsibility.       
The sale of structured products has predominantly been conducted by financial advisers 
stationed at the bank, but also in some cases through agents and other providers.  In the 
survey conducted by Kredittilsynet, the banks were asked to account for how they separate 
between the areas of sales and advising; the report concluded that this line of separation was 
unclear (Kredittilsynet, 2008).  Just over 50 per cent of the respondents claim that they 
separate between advising and selling structured products, however many would argue that it 
is questionable how clearly this distinction have been communicated to the customers 
(Tørring, 2009; Sparre M. , 2008; Bergo, 2007; Flesland R. S., 2009; Berge & Forseth, 
2009).  Also, more than half of the respondents to Kredittilsynet‟s survey admitted that their 
sellers/advisers receive financial rewards from selling structured products, and 20% of the 
banks provided additional rewards when these products were debt financed, including DnB 
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NOR (Kredittilsynet, 2008).  Hence, the financial incentive to sell (debt financed) structured 
products was strong, and we have previously discussed how moral objections seems to have 
had little influence over this decision.  It has been proposed that a seller should be unable to 
use the title „financial adviser‟ when he receives commission, bonuses or other financial 
incentives from recommending or selling products (Finansdepartementet, 2009), and I 
believe such an enforcement is highly necessary.  For what factors must necessarily be 
present in order to call it advising, and not selling?  Providing sound financial advice entails 
a thorough evaluation of the investor with respect to at least the following dimensions; the 
investor‟s experience, his loss aversion, risk preferences, financial goals, liquidity needs and 
time frame.  Many would also argue that investment universe recommended by an adviser 
cannot be limited to one bank‟s products only, i.e. that the adviser must be completely 
independent.  The „financial advisers‟ employed by banks are clearly not independent, and 
are according to Forbrukerrådet‟s survey in many cases also unable to accurately evaluate 
the needs of their customers (Forbrukerrådet, 2009a).  The investment in structured products 
has as such generally not been a result of financial advising, but a consequence of good 
salesmanship.  Norwegian non-professional investors have (blindly) trusted the 
recommendations received from what are, in essence, glorified sellers, without considering 
the fact that these financial advisers might not solely be acting in their clients‟ best interests.   
The recommendation of structured products as an investment strategy is as such not sound 
advice, but a pure sales pitch, and constitutes evidence that intermediaries, who at the same 
time acting as advisers and distributors, have been able to misuse trust and confidence in the 
market.   
The problem of asymmetric information in the structured product market demonstrates why 
the financial industry is among the most regulated sectors of an economy.  Yet we have seen 
that the appropriate Norwegian supervisory bodies were relatively slow to react to the 
conditions in the market, particularly with respect to controlling the role of the seller/adviser 
(Holst I. R., 2008b).  It was the business press that first blew the whistle on these 
questionable practices
36
, and it was only after significant media pressure that authorities took 
necessary action.  However, since first entering the game it seems that Kredittilsynet is 
giving priority to monitoring how banks and investment firms practice the new, stricter 
                                                 
36 Particularly Dine Penger and editor in chief Tom Staavi (Tørrvold, 2009) 
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requirements concerning advisory services and the distribution of structured products 
(Kleven, 2008).  Through a series of on-site inspections at relatively newly established 
investment firms the regulators revealed a series of infringements regarding the duties 
towards customers pursuant to the Securities Trading Act, some of which led to a licence 
withdrawal (Glitnir Privatøkonomi and Caveo are examples of this) (Flesland S. , 2009; 
Holst I. , 2008a).     
While the development in the market for structured products makes a strong case for a 
significant regulatory presence, it is important to keep in mind that the regulators are likely 
to continuously be one step behind the industry.  A consequence of financial innovation is 
that the regulation of financial markets will always be reactive as opposed to proactive, since 
the government cannot regulate products that have yet to be created.  Thus, the regulators 
have included a provision concerning appropriate business conduct in the Securities Trading 
Act (chapter 10) as one of the factors ensuring investor protection and a minimum standard 
when providing investment advice.  Because financial institutions are given exclusive rights 
to carry out investment services they are in a position that “implies special duties to care for 
their clients” (Kleven, 2008), and customers are as such entitled to receive financial advice 
that suit their individual needs and protects their interests.  This provision implies that it 
cannot solely be a governmental responsibility to ensure prudent business practices and 
prevent misconduct; this also constitutes an ethical responsibility to the banks and other 
corporations in the industry.  The gap that is created when governmental authority is 
incapable of immediate action must be closed through socially responsible corporate 
practices.    
It would be an interesting topic for future master theses to investigate how financial advisers 
and institutions practice the new regulatory requirements following MiFID and other 
amendments to the Securities Trading Act.  Another topic could be an analysis of the quality 
and soundness of investment advice given by financial advisers employed by banks.  
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8. Appendix 
8.1 6-year correlations and volatilities for the Global and 
Sektor portfolios from Johnsen (2008) 
8.1.1 6-year historic volatility for Global sub-indices 
8.1.2 6-year historic correlation for Global sub-indices 
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8.1.3 6-year historic volatility for Sektor sub-indices 
 
8.1.4 6-year historic correlation for Sektor sub-indices 
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8.2 Excel macros (Visual Basic for Applications) 
8.2.1 Code for Cholesky decomposition 
The Cholesky decomposition is commonly used in the MC method for simulating systems 
with multiple correlated variables: The matrix of inter-variable correlations is decomposed, 
to give the lower-triangular L. Applying this to a vector of uncorrelated simulated shocks, u, 
produces a shock vector Lu with the covariance properties of the system being modeled.  
The following code is from Bøe (2007) 
 
 
  
Public Function Cholesky(mat As Range) 
Dim a, L() As Double, S As Double 
a = mat 
N = mat.Rows.Count 
M = mat.Columns.Count 
If N <> M Then 
    Cholesky = "?" 
    Exit Function 
End If 
 
ReDim L(1 To N, 1 To N) 
For j = 1 To N 
    S = 0 
    For K = 1 To j - 1 
        S = S + L(j, K) ^ 2 
    Next K 
    L(j, j) = a(j, j) - S 
    If L(j, j) <= 0 Then Exit For 
    L(j, j) = Sqr(L(j, j)) 
     
    For i = j + 1 To N 
        S = 0 
        For K = 1 To j - 1 
            S = S + L(i, K) * L(j, K) 
        Next K 
        L(i, j) = (a(i, j) - S) / L(j, j) 
    Next i 
Next j 
Cholesky = L 
End Function 
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8.2.2 Code for the simulation sub CalculateOption() 
The following sub was written in VBA for the purpose of running the Monte Carlo 
simulation.  The sub is based on lecture materials from FIE425 Derivatives and risk 
management which in the autumn semester 2007 was taught by Professor Svein Arne-
Persson. 
  
Sub CalculateOption() 
 
  Columns("q:q").ClearContents 
  Application.ScreenUpdating = False 
   
i = 0 
Dim time As Double 
time = Now 
 
iterations = Range("c19").Value 
 
Do While i < (iterations + 1) 
 
Range("q" & i + 1).Value = Range("c25").Value 
i = i + 1 
Ark1.Calculate 
 
Loop 
Range("C30").Value = Now - time 
 
 
End Sub 
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8.3 Estimated volatility and correlations for sub indices 
The following tables shows the percent by which volatility (correlation) for the individual 
indices would need to increase holding correlation (volatility) constant, in order to 
correspond with the expected portfolio volatility for DnB NOR and Johnsen respectively.  
8.3.1 DnB NOR Markets: Global 
 
 
  
+
EuroSTOXX50 S&P500 Nikkei225 GLOBAL
+
EuroStoxx 50 
vs S&P 500
EuroStoxx 50 
vs Nikkei225
S&P 500 vs 
Nikkei225
GLOBAL
-       19.00% 16.70% 22.30% 14.22% -     0.39          0.28          0.06          14.22%
1% 19.19% 16.87% 22.52% 14.36% 1% 0.3939      0.2828      0.0606      14.24%
2% 19.38% 17.03% 22.75% 14.50% 2% 0.3978      0.2856      0.0612      14.26%
3% 19.57% 17.20% 22.97% 14.64% 3% 0.4017      0.2884      0.0618      14.28%
4% 19.76% 17.37% 23.19% 14.79% 4% 0.4056      0.2912      0.0624      14.31%
5% 19.95% 17.54% 23.42% 14.93% 5% 0.4095      0.2940      0.0630      14.33%
6% 20.14% 17.70% 23.64% 15.07% 6% 0.4134      0.2968      0.0636      14.35%
7% 20.33% 17.87% 23.86% 15.21% 7% 0.4173      0.2996      0.0642      14.37%
8% 20.52% 18.04% 24.08% 15.36% 8% 0.4212      0.3024      0.0648      14.40%
9% 20.71% 18.20% 24.31% 15.50% 9% 0.4251      0.3052      0.0654      14.42%
10% 20.90% 18.37% 24.53% 15.64% 10% 0.4290      0.3080      0.0660      14.44%
45% 27.55% 24.22% 32.34% 20.62% 45% 0.5655      0.4060      0.0870      15.19%
46% 27.74% 24.38% 32.56% 20.76% 46% 0.5694      0.4088      0.0876      15.21%
47% 27.93% 24.55% 32.78% 20.90% 47% 0.5733      0.4116      0.0882      15.23%
48% 28.12% 24.72% 33.00% 21.04% 48% 0.5772      0.4144      0.0888      15.25%
49% 28.31% 24.88% 33.23% 21.18% 49% 0.5811      0.4172      0.0894      15.27%
50% 28.50% 25.05% 33.45% 21.33% 50% 0.5850      0.4200      0.0900      15.29%
51% 28.69% 25.22% 33.67% 21.47% 51% 0.5889      0.4228      0.0906      15.31%
52% 28.88% 25.38% 33.90% 21.61% 52% 0.5928      0.4256      0.0912      15.33%
53% 29.07% 25.55% 34.12% 21.75% 53% 0.5967      0.4284      0.0918      15.35%
54% 29.26% 25.72% 34.34% 21.90% 54% 0.6006      0.4312      0.0924      15.37%
55% 29.45% 25.89% 34.57% 22.04% 55% 0.6045      0.4340      0.0930      15.40%
56% 29.64% 26.05% 34.79% 22.18% 56% 0.6084      0.4368      0.0936      15.42%
66.03% 31.55% 27.73% 37.02% 23.61% 560% 2.5730      1.8473      0.3958      23.60%
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8.3.2 DnB NOR Markets: Sektor  
 
 
  
+
STOXX 
Healthcare
STOXX 
Telecom
STOXX Bank SEKTOR
+
Healthcare vs 
Telecom
Healthcare vs 
Bank
Telecom vs 
Bank
GLOBAL
- 18.00% 25.20% 19.80% 17.68% -    0.48           0.60           0.60           17.68%
1% 18.18% 25.45% 20.00% 17.86% 1% 0.4848      0.6060      0.6060      17.73%
2% 18.36% 25.70% 20.20% 18.03% 2% 0.4896      0.6120      0.6120      17.77%
3% 18.54% 25.96% 20.39% 18.21% 3% 0.4944      0.6180      0.6180      17.82%
4% 18.72% 26.21% 20.59% 18.39% 4% 0.4992      0.6240      0.6240      17.86%
5% 18.90% 26.46% 20.79% 18.56% 5% 0.5040      0.6300      0.6300      17.91%
27% 22.86% 32.00% 25.15% 22.45% 27% 0.6096      0.7620      0.7620      18.88%
28% 23.04% 32.26% 25.34% 22.63% 28% 0.6144      0.7680      0.7680      18.92%
29% 23.22% 32.51% 25.54% 22.81% 29% 0.6192      0.7740      0.7740      18.96%
30% 23.40% 32.76% 25.74% 22.98% 30% 0.6240      0.7800      0.7800      19.01%
31% 23.58% 33.01% 25.94% 23.16% 31% 0.6288      0.7860      0.7860      19.05%
32% 23.76% 33.26% 26.14% 23.34% 32% 0.6336      0.7920      0.7920      19.09%
33% 23.94% 33.52% 26.33% 23.51% 33% 0.6384      0.7980      0.7980      19.14%
34% 24.12% 33.77% 26.53% 23.69% 34% 0.6432      0.8040      0.8040      19.18%
45% 26.10% 36.54% 28.71% 25.63% 45% 0.6960      0.8700      0.8700      19.64%
46% 26.28% 36.79% 28.91% 25.81% 46% 0.7008      0.8760      0.8760      19.68%
47% 26.46% 37.04% 29.11% 25.99% 47% 0.7056      0.8820      0.8820      19.72%
48% 26.64% 37.30% 29.30% 26.17% 48% 0.7104      0.8880      0.8880      19.76%
49% 26.82% 37.55% 29.50% 26.34% 49% 0.7152      0.8940      0.8940      19.80%
50% 27.00% 37.80% 29.70% 26.52% 50% 0.7200      0.9000      0.9000      19.84%
51% 27.18% 38.05% 29.90% 26.70% 51% 0.7248      0.9060      0.9060      19.88%
52% 27.36% 38.30% 30.10% 26.87% 52% 0.7296      0.9120      0.9120      19.93%
53% 27.54% 38.56% 30.29% 27.05% 53% 0.7344      0.9180      0.9180      19.97%
54% 27.72% 38.81% 30.49% 27.23% 54% 0.7392      0.9240      0.9240      20.01%
55% 27.90% 39.06% 30.69% 27.40% 55% 0.7440      0.9300      0.9300      20.05%
78% 32.04% 44.86% 35.24% 31.47% 78% 0.8544      1.0680      1.0680      20.96%
79% 32.22% 45.11% 35.44% 31.65% 79% 0.8592      1.0740      1.0740      21.00%
62% 29.12% 40.77% 32.03% 28.60% 311% 1.9735      2.4669      2.4669      28.60%
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8.3.3 Johnsen: Global 
 
  
+
EuroSTOXX50 S&P500 Nikkei225 GLOBAL
+
EuroStoxx 50 
vs S&P 500
EuroStoxx 50 
vs Nikkei225
S&P 500 vs 
Nikkei225
GLOBAL
-      19.00% 16.70% 22.30% 14.22% -   0.39           0.28           0.06           14.22%
1% 19.19% 16.87% 22.52% 14.36% 1% 0.3939      0.2828      0.0606      14.24%
2% 19.38% 17.03% 22.75% 14.50% 2% 0.3978      0.2856      0.0612      14.26%
3% 19.57% 17.20% 22.97% 14.64% 3% 0.4017      0.2884      0.0618      14.28%
11% 21.09% 18.54% 24.75% 15.78% 11% 0.4329      0.3108      0.0666      14.46%
12% 21.28% 18.70% 24.98% 15.92% 12% 0.4368      0.3136      0.0672      14.48%
13% 21.47% 18.87% 25.20% 16.07% 13% 0.4407      0.3164      0.0678      14.50%
14% 21.66% 19.04% 25.42% 16.21% 14% 0.4446      0.3192      0.0684      14.53%
15% 21.85% 19.21% 25.65% 16.35% 15% 0.4485      0.3220      0.0690      14.55%
16% 22.04% 19.37% 25.87% 16.49% 16% 0.4524      0.3248      0.0696      14.57%
17% 22.23% 19.54% 26.09% 16.64% 17% 0.4563      0.3276      0.0702      14.59%
18% 22.42% 19.71% 26.31% 16.78% 18% 0.4602      0.3304      0.0708      14.61%
19% 22.61% 19.87% 26.54% 16.92% 19% 0.4641      0.3332      0.0714      14.64%
20% 22.80% 20.04% 26.76% 17.06% 20% 0.4680      0.3360      0.0720      14.66%
21% 22.99% 20.21% 26.98% 17.20% 21% 0.4719      0.3388      0.0726      14.68%
22% 23.18% 20.37% 27.21% 17.35% 22% 0.4758      0.3416      0.0732      14.70%
23% 23.37% 20.54% 27.43% 17.49% 23% 0.4797      0.3444      0.0738      14.72%
24% 23.56% 20.71% 27.65% 17.63% 24% 0.4836      0.3472      0.0744      14.74%
36% 25.84% 22.71% 30.33% 19.34% 36% 0.5304      0.3808      0.0816      15.00%
37% 26.03% 22.88% 30.55% 19.48% 37% 0.5343      0.3836      0.0822      15.02%
38% 26.22% 23.05% 30.77% 19.62% 38% 0.5382      0.3864      0.0828      15.04%
39% 26.41% 23.21% 31.00% 19.76% 39% 0.5421      0.3892      0.0834      15.06%
40% 26.60% 23.38% 31.22% 19.91% 40% 0.5460      0.3920      0.0840      15.08%
41% 26.79% 23.55% 31.44% 20.05% 41% 0.5499      0.3948      0.0846      15.10%
42% 26.98% 23.71% 31.67% 20.19% 42% 0.5538      0.3976      0.0852      15.13%
43% 27.17% 23.88% 31.89% 20.33% 43% 0.5577      0.4004      0.0858      15.15%
71% 32.49% 28.56% 38.13% 24.31% 71% 0.6669      0.4788      0.1026      15.72%
72% 32.68% 28.72% 38.36% 24.45% 72% 0.6708      0.4816      0.1032      15.74%
26.6% 24.05% 21.14% 28.23% 18.00% 192% 1.1397      0.8182      0.1753      18.00%
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8.3.4 Johnsen: Sektor 
+
STOXX 
Healthcare
STOXX 
Telecom
STOXX Bank SEKTOR
+
Healthcare vs 
Telecom
Healthcare vs 
Bank
Telecom vs 
Bank
GLOBAL
-     18.00% 25.20% 19.80% 17.68% -    0.48           0.60           0.60           17.68%
1% 18.18% 25.45% 20.00% 17.86% 1% 0.4848      0.6060      0.6060      17.73%
2% 18.36% 25.70% 20.20% 18.03% 2% 0.4896      0.6120      0.6120      17.77%
3% 18.54% 25.96% 20.39% 18.21% 3% 0.4944      0.6180      0.6180      17.82%
15% 20.70% 28.98% 22.77% 20.33% 15% 0.5520      0.6900      0.6900      18.36%
16% 20.88% 29.23% 22.97% 20.51% 16% 0.5568      0.6960      0.6960      18.40%
17% 21.06% 29.48% 23.17% 20.68% 17% 0.5616      0.7020      0.7020      18.44%
18% 21.24% 29.74% 23.36% 20.86% 18% 0.5664      0.7080      0.7080      18.49%
19% 21.42% 29.99% 23.56% 21.04% 19% 0.5712      0.7140      0.7140      18.53%
20% 21.60% 30.24% 23.76% 21.21% 20% 0.5760      0.7200      0.7200      18.58%
21% 21.78% 30.49% 23.96% 21.39% 21% 0.5808      0.7260      0.7260      18.62%
22% 21.96% 30.74% 24.16% 21.57% 22% 0.5856      0.7320      0.7320      18.66%
23% 22.14% 31.00% 24.35% 21.75% 23% 0.5904      0.7380      0.7380      18.71%
24% 22.32% 31.25% 24.55% 21.92% 24% 0.5952      0.7440      0.7440      18.75%
63% 29.34% 41.08% 32.27% 28.82% 63% 0.7824      0.9780      0.9780      20.37%
64% 29.52% 41.33% 32.47% 28.99% 64% 0.7872      0.9840      0.9840      20.41%
65% 29.70% 41.58% 32.67% 29.17% 65% 0.7920      0.9900      0.9900      20.45%
66% 29.88% 41.83% 32.87% 29.35% 66% 0.7968      0.9960      0.9960      20.49%
67% 30.06% 42.08% 33.07% 29.52% 67% 0.8016      1.0020      1.0020      20.53%
68% 30.24% 42.34% 33.26% 29.70% 68% 0.8064      1.0080      1.0080      20.57%
69% 30.42% 42.59% 33.46% 29.88% 69% 0.8112      1.0140      1.0140      20.61%
70% 30.60% 42.84% 33.66% 30.05% 70% 0.8160      1.0200      1.0200      20.65%
71% 30.78% 43.09% 33.86% 30.23% 71% 0.8208      1.0260      1.0260      20.69%
72% 30.96% 43.34% 34.06% 30.41% 72% 0.8256      1.0320      1.0320      20.72%
24.4% 22.40% 31.36% 24.64% 22.00% 106% 0.9866      1.2333      1.2333      22.00%
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8.4 Simulation results 
8.4.1 Simulation results DnB NOR: Global, arithmetic risk 
premiums 
 
8.4.2 Simulation results DnB NOR: Global, geometric risk 
premiums 
 
8.4.3 Simulation results DnB NOR: Sektor, arithmetic risk 
premiums 
 
 
Number of runs Return on option
Return on indexed 
bond TR Equity P.a. Return equity TR Debt P.a. Return debt
Standard deviation of 
total simulation
10 87.9632% 92.3614% 84.0779% 10.7049% 21.7787% 3.3384% 38.7405%
100 71.0346% 74.5864% 67.0683% 8.9304% 4.0037% 0.6564% 7.8698%
1,000 72.0134% 75.6140% 68.0517% 9.0370% 5.0314% 0.8215% 3.1381%
10,000 67.0514% 70.4040% 63.0660% 8.4910% -0.1787% -0.0298% 0.9106%
100,000 67.2298% 70.5913% 63.2453% 8.5109% 0.0087% 0.0014% 0.2859%
1,000,000 67.8115% 71.2021% 63.8298% 8.5756% 0.6195% 0.1030% 0.0914%
95% confidence 
interval for trial
Equity:                            
μ - (1.96*σ)/√m
Equity:                             
μ + (1.96*σ)/√m
Debt:                               
μ - (1.96*σ)/√m
Debt:                               
μ + (1.96*σ)/√m
10 -13.3067% 34.7165% -20.6732% 27.3501%
100 7.3879% 10.4729% -0.8861% 2.1989%
1,000 8.8425% 9.2315% 0.6270% 1.0160%
10,000 8.4732% 8.5089% -0.0477% -0.0120%
100,000 8.5091% 8.5127% -0.0003% 0.0032%
1,000,000 8.5754% 8.5758% 0.1028% 0.1032%
Number of runs Return on option
Return on indexed 
bond TR Equity P.a. Return equity TR Debt P.a. Return debt
Standard deviation of 
total simulation
10 53.2747% 55.9384% 49.2233% 6.8988% -14.6443% -2.6045% 26.4966%
100 43.9962% 46.1960% 39.9005% 5.7556% -24.3867% -4.5521% 6.1275%
1,000 53.0747% 55.7285% 49.0225% 6.8748% -14.8542% -2.6445% 2.4179%
10,000 55.3002% 58.0652% 51.2586% 7.1404% -12.5174% -2.2042% 0.7910%
100,000 55.7918% 58.5814% 51.7526% 7.1987% -12.0012% -2.1082% 0.2521%
95% confidence 
interval for trial
Equity:                            
μ - (1.96*σ)/√m
Equity:                            
μ + (1.96*σ)/√m
Debt:                               
μ - (1.96*σ)/√m
Debt:                               
μ + (1.96*σ)/√m
10 -9.5240% 23.3216% -19.0273% 13.8182%
100 4.5546% 6.9566% -5.7531% -3.3511%
1,000 6.7249% 7.0247% -2.7943% -2.4946%
10,000 7.1249% 7.1559% -2.2197% -2.1887%
100,000 7.1971% 7.2002% -2.1098% -2.1067%
Number of runs Return on option
Return on indexed 
bond TR Equity P.a. Return equity TR Debt P.a. Return debt
Standard deviation of 
total simulation
10 71.3141% 71.3141% 63.9369% 8.5874% 0.7314% 0.1215% 21.2429%
100 67.8770% 67.8770% 60.6478% 8.2212% -2.7057% -0.4561% 9.23%
1,000 80.9670% 80.9670% 73.1742% 9.5840% 10.3844% 1.6603% 3.29%
10,000 80.4403% 80.4403% 72.6702% 9.5308% 9.8577% 1.5793% 1.15%
100,000 80.3431% 80.3431% 72.5771% 9.5209% 9.7604% 1.5643% 0.37%
1,000,000 80.3695% 80.3695% 72.6024% 9.5236% 9.7868% 1.5683% 0.12%
95% confidence 
interval for trial
Equity:                            
μ - (1.96*σ)/√m
Equity:                            
μ + (1.96*σ)/√m
Debt:                               
μ - (1.96*σ)/√m
Debt:                               
μ + (1.96*σ)/√m
10 -4.5791% 21.7539% -13.0450% 13.2880%
100 6.4117% 10.0308% -2.2657% 1.3534%
1,000 9.3799% 9.7881% 1.4561% 1.8644%
10,000 9.5082% 9.5534% 1.5566% 1.6019%
100,000 9.5187% 9.5232% 1.5620% 1.5666%
1,000,000 9.5234% 9.5238% 1.5681% 1.5686%
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8.4.4 Simulation results DnB NOR: Sektor, geometric risk 
premiums 
 
8.4.5 Simulation results Johnsen: Global, arithmetic risk premiums 
 
8.4.6 Simulation results Johnsen: Global, geometric risk premiums 
 
Number of runs Return on option
Return on indexed 
bond TR Equity P.a. Return equity TR Debt P.a. Return debt
Standard deviation of 
total simulation
10 49.5373% 49.5373% 43.0979% 6.1546% -21.0453% -3.8617% 23.7498%
100 42.6805% 42.6805% 36.5364% 5.3274% -27.9022% -5.3065% 7.15%
1,000 57.8602% 57.8602% 51.0624% 7.1172% -12.7224% -2.2424% 2.92%
10,000 53.8442% 53.8442% 47.2193% 6.6582% -16.7385% -3.0069% 0.88%
100,000 54.9173% 54.9173% 48.2462% 6.7818% -15.6654% -2.7997% 0.29%
95% confidence 
interval for trial
Equity:                            
μ - (1.96*σ)/√m
Equity:                            
μ + (1.96*σ)/√m
Debt:                               
μ - (1.96*σ)/√m
Debt:                               
μ + (1.96*σ)/√m
10 -8.5657% 20.8749% -18.5820% 10.8585%
100 3.9266% 6.7282% -6.7072% -3.9057%
1,000 6.9364% 7.2981% -2.4232% -2.0616%
10,000 6.6409% 6.6754% -3.0242% -2.9897%
100,000 6.7800% 6.7836% -2.8015% -2.7979%
Number of runs Return on option
Return on indexed 
bond TR Equity P.a. Return equity TR Debt P.a. Return debt
Standard deviation of 
total simulation
10 52.3208% 54.9368% 48.2649% 6.7841% -15.6458% -2.7959% 21.8008%
100 42.5866% 44.7159% 38.4842% 5.5764% -25.8667% -4.8660% 5.1897%
1,000 52.1394% 54.7464% 48.0827% 6.7622% -15.8363% -2.8325% 2.0226%
10,000 51.5648% 54.1431% 47.5054% 6.6927% -16.4396% -2.9490% 0.5976%
100,000 51.9542% 54.5519% 47.8966% 6.7398% -16.0307% -2.8700% 0.1912%
1,000,000 51.7816% 54.3707% 47.7231% 6.7189% -16.2120% -2.9050% 0.0600%
95% confidence 
interval for trial
Equity:                            
μ - (1.96*σ)/√m
Equity:                              
μ + (1.96*σ)/√m
Debt:                               
μ - (1.96*σ)/√m
Debt:                               
μ + (1.96*σ)/√m
10 -6.7282% 20.2963% -16.3082% 10.7164%
100 4.5592% 6.5935% -5.8832% -3.8489%
1,000 6.6368% 6.8875% -2.9579% -2.7072%
10,000 6.6810% 6.7044% -2.9607% -2.9373%
100,000 6.7386% 6.7410% -2.8712% -2.8688%
1,000,000 6.7188% 6.7190% -2.9051% -2.9049%
Number of runs Return on option
Return on indexed 
bond TR Equity P.a. Return equity TR Debt P.a. Return debt
Standard deviation of 
total simulation
10 24.4967% 25.7215% 20.3077% 3.1293% -44.8611% -9.4456% 9.6864%
100 37.0346% 38.8863% 32.9056% 4.8553% -31.6964% -6.1558% 5.25%
1,000 47.6260% 50.0073% 43.5476% 6.2101% -20.5754% -3.7666% 1.7690%
10,000 45.6537% 47.9364% 41.5659% 5.9643% -22.6463% -4.1894% 0.5607%
100,000 46.2152% 48.5259% 42.1301% 6.0346% -22.0567% -4.0681% 0.1773%
95% confidence 
interval for trial
Equity:                            
μ - (1.96*σ)/√m
Equity:                            
μ + (1.96*σ)/√m
Debt:                               
μ - (1.96*σ)/√m
Debt:                               
μ + (1.96*σ)/√m
10 -2.8743% 9.1330% -15.4493% -3.4419%
100 3.8273% 5.8834% -7.1839% -5.1278%
1,000 6.1005% 6.3198% -3.8762% -3.6569%
10,000 5.9534% 5.9753% -4.2004% -4.1784%
100,000 6.0335% 6.0357% -4.0692% -4.0670%
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8.4.7 Simulation results Johnsen: Sektor, arithmetic risk premiums 
 
8.4.8 Simulation results Johnsen: Sektor, geometric risk premiums 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of runs Return on option
Return on indexed 
bond TR Equity P.a. Return equity TR Debt P.a. Return debt
Standard deviation of 
total simulation
10 55.9628% 55.9628% 49.2467% 6.9016% -14.6199% -2.5999% 19.5991%
100 51.8884% 51.8884% 45.3478% 6.4310% -18.6942% -3.3904% 6.6251%
1,000 63.2511% 63.2511% 56.2211% 7.7184% -7.3316% -1.2610% 2.4027%
10,000 60.1034% 60.1034% 53.2090% 7.3695% -10.4792% -1.8281% 0.7505%
100,000 59.7128% 59.7128% 52.8352% 7.3257% -10.8699% -1.8996% 0.23%
1,000,000 59.7169% 59.7169% 52.8392% 7.3262% -10.8657% -1.8988% 0.07%
95% confidence 
interval for trial
Equity:                            
μ - (1.96*σ)/√m
Equity:                            
μ + (1.96*σ)/√m
Debt:                               
μ - (1.96*σ)/√m
Debt:                               
μ + (1.96*σ)/√m
10 -5.2461% 19.0492% -14.7476% 9.5478%
100 5.1325% 7.7295% -4.6889% -2.0919%
1,000 7.5695% 7.8673% -1.4099% -1.1121%
10,000 7.3547% 7.3842% -1.8428% -1.8134%
100,000 7.3243% 7.3272% -1.9011% -1.8982%
1,000,000 7.3261% 7.3264% -1.8990% -1.8987%
Number of runs Return on option
Return on indexed 
bond TR Equity P.a. Return equity TR Debt P.a. Return debt
Standard deviation of 
total simulation
10 30.9995% 32.5495% 26.8416% 4.0424% -38.0332% -7.6664% 9.6995%
100 43.6900% 45.8745% 39.5928% 5.7168% -24.7082% -4.6199% 6.2655%
1,000 40.6273% 42.6587% 36.5155% 5.3247% -27.9240% -5.3112% 1.7739%
10,000 46.2434% 48.5555% 42.1584% 6.0381% -22.0271% -4.0620% 0.6447%
100,000 45.1015% 47.3566% 41.0111% 5.8950% -23.2260% -4.3095% 0.20%
95% confidence 
interval for trial
Equity:                            
μ - (1.96*σ)/√m
Equity:                            
μ + (1.96*σ)/√m
Debt:                               
μ - (1.96*σ)/√m
Debt:                               
μ + (1.96*σ)/√m
10 -1.9694% 10.0542% -13.6782% -1.6546%
100 4.4887% 6.9448% -5.8479% -3.3918%
1,000 5.2148% 5.4347% -5.4212% -5.2013%
10,000 6.0255% 6.0508% -4.0747% -4.0494%
100,000 5.8938% 5.8963% -4.3107% -4.3082%
